Le processus de paix colombien – Wikipedia ® garantie santé entreprise

Qu’est-ce que l’assurance professionnelle ?
L’assurance responsabilité civile prostituée (RC Pro) est un type d’assurance qui couvre les préjudices matériels ainsi qu’à corporels provoqués par un intervention professionnel, que ce va pour ça sur votre lieu de travail ainsi qu’à d’une mission.

Elle prend en charge causés à des tiers, qu’ils soient liés selon une relation contractuelle (clients, partenaires, fournisseurs) ou non et garantit les :

corporels ;
matériels ;
immatériels.
Cette formule super complète donne l’occasion aux constructeur de regrouper différentes aplomb en une seule. Elle offre des garanties essentielles par contre aussi des options complémentaires que chacun souscrire selon caractères de sa profession. En effet, chauffeur de taxi, boulanger ou bien pharmacien ne sont pas soumis aux mêmes risques et n’ont ainsi pas les mêmes besoins.

Qui est concernée parmi l’assurance prostituée ?
L’assurance professionnelle n’est pas obligatoire sauf pour les maîtrise réglementées ou bien libérales telles que :
avocats ;
huissiers ;
les agents immobiliers ;
constructeur ;
habileté médicales ;
les du place de la comptabilité ;
les agents généraux d’assurance ;
façonnier du bâtiment.
Que couvre l’assurance pro ?
L’assurance responsabilité civile professionnel prend en charge l’indemnisation des tiers en d’accident causé parmi :

une erreur ;
une faute ;
une hardiesse ;
une négligence ;
l’un de vos employés ou sous-traitants ;
vos locaux ;
un animal vous ;
votre matériel professionnel.
Notez que l’assurance pro couvre aussi votre activité et vos biens experts en cas d’incendie, de dégât des eaux, de catastrophe naturelle, de vol mais aussi de vandalisme.

Le processus de paix colombien se réfère au processus de paix entre le gouvernement du président colombien Juan Manuel Santos et les Forces armées révolutionnaires colombiennes (FARC – EP) en vue de mettre fin au conflit en Colombie. Les négociations ont commencé en 2012. Septembre Et principalement à La Havane, à Cuba. Les négociateurs annoncent un accord final pour mettre fin au conflit et créer une paix durable en 2016. 24 août Cependant, le référendum pour ratifier l'accord en 2016. 2 octobre A été infructueux après 50,2 pour cent. Les électeurs ont voté contre l'accord, 49,8%. . Plus tard, le gouvernement colombien et les FARC le 24 novembre. Il a signé un accord de paix révisé et l'a envoyé au Congrès pour qu'il le ratifie au lieu de tenir un deuxième référendum.(1) Les deux chambres du congrès 2016 29-30 novembre Il a ratifié l'accord de paix révisé, marquant la fin du conflit.(2)

Contexte général(Éditer)

Le conflit armé colombien est le plus ancien conflit armé en cours en Amérique. Il a débuté en 1964 par certains moyens. Avec la mise en place des forces armées révolutionnaires colombiennes (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombie), le groupe de guérilla de gauche le plus important du pays.

1990 et 1991. Les pourparlers de paix avec plusieurs mouvements de guérilla plus petits ont été démobilisés et transformés en personnalités politiques civiles. Le 19 avril, le premier groupe de partisans à avoir été démobilisé après un accord de paix avec le gouvernement colombien. Un mouvement (M-19) qui a démobilisé et rendu les armes en échange d'une amnistie totale pour tous les actes commis pendant le conflit. Les autres groupes de guérilla démobilisés dans des conditions similaires étaient majoritaires dans l'Armée de libération du peuple (EPL) et Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL).(3) Cependant, toutes les tentatives répétées de trouver un processus de négociation par le biais de pourparlers de paix formels entre le gouvernement et les FARC ont été infructueuses. Avant le processus de paix actuel, la dernière tentative de négociations de paix avec les FARC avait eu lieu entre 1999 et 2002. Le processus de paix du président Andrés Pastrana, reconnu par les FARC comme une zone démilitarisée facilitant les pourparlers de paix sur le territoire colombien. Bien que le processus de paix ait duré trois ans, aucun accord n'a été conclu entre les deux parties. 2002 20 février, quelques mois avant 2002 Après l'élection présidentielle, Pastrana a officiellement mis fin à toutes les négociations et a ordonné à l'armée de prendre le contrôle de la zone démilitarisée. Les FARC ont utilisé la zone démilitarisée comme zone de sécurité pour garder des otages, négocier des échanges de prisonniers, former des troupes et planifier des actions offensives.(4):167-169Le processus de paix paralysé a coïncidé avec l'escalade du conflit en raison de divers facteurs, dont l'expansion numérique et géographique rapide de groupes paramilitaires tels que la Force colombienne d'autodéfense (AUC), qui s'est opposée aux pourparlers du gouvernement avec les FARC. 1998-2002 Cette période a été l’une des plus brutales de l’histoire récente de la Colombie. Les homicides nationaux sont passés de 58,92 (1998) à 69,69 / 100 000 habitants (2002).(5) En outre, il y a eu 390 attaques de civils, dont la plupart ont été menées par les FARC; 1998-2002 plus de 3 000 personnes sont enlevées chaque année et 898 meurtres sont commis, principalement par des groupes paramilitaires, et plus de 5 400.(6)

La désillusion généralisée et le désenchantement vis-à-vis du processus de paix ont conduit à l'élection de Álvaro Uribe en 2002. Mai Une plateforme obsédante qui s'oppose à tout dialogue futur sans interrompre les hostilités et les activités terroristes. En tant que président, Uribe a approuvé ces vues dans le cadre de sa politique de sécurité démocratique (seguridad Democrática), qui a redéfini le conflit avec la guérilla de gauche comme une guerre contre le terrorisme et le trafic de drogue et promis de "punir indûment" les actes terroristes, de perturber les organisations terroristes et de réaffirmer la présence de l'État sur tout le territoire.(7) Dans le cadre de sa politique d'accompagnement, Uribe a adopté plusieurs programmes de démobilisation individuels et collectifs, promettant le pardon des crimes politiques et une aide humanitaire aux combattants qui en obéissent. Ces ordonnances et lois, ainsi que la loi sur la justice et la paix contestée (2005), ont fourni la base légale pour la démobilisation des groupes paramilitaires entre 2003 et 2006.

Avec le rejet de la nouvelle politique d'Uribe par les FARC, le gouvernement a lancé une vaste attaque militaire, politique et judiciaire contre les partisans, entraînant une réduction spectaculaire de leurs capacités militaires, même s'il s'agissait de violations graves des droits humains par les forces armées. fausses déclarations ").(4):178-179 L’offensive de l’État a obligé les FARC à se replier sur leurs marges, avec des résultats notables tels que la sécurisation des principales routes du pays, la réduction du nombre d’enlèvements, la réduction du nombre d’assassinats et la restauration du pouvoir gouvernemental dans plusieurs régions. Pays.(4):180 Au total, ces résultats très médiatisés ont rendu Uribe particulièrement populaire et lui ont fourni un capital politique suffisant pour adopter avec succès un amendement constitutionnel au Congrès lui permettant de voter en 2006. Servir pour un second mandat successif. Mais avec l’armée et la police qui ont repris le contrôle des zones dans lesquelles la guérilla avait étendu son influence dans les années 1980 et 1990, les FARC ont montré qu’elles pouvaient se réinstaller et devenir militairement actives dans de nouvelles campagnes et régions frontalières stratégiques.(4):181 Les FARC ont démontré leur résilience militaire lors des attaques terroristes en milieu urbain (attentat à la bombe de 2003 au club El Nogal) et en 2005.(8)

Álvaro Uribe a été réélu lors d’un glissement de terrain en 2006. Et a fait de la "consolidation" de la sécurité démocratique l'une des priorités de son deuxième mandat. De 2006 à 2010 Les FARC ont été durement frappées par l'armée et ont pour la première fois ciblé avec succès des membres haut placés du secrétariat des FARC. 2008 Mars Raúl Reyes a été tué lors d'une opération transfrontalière en Équateur (qui a déclenché une crise diplomatique majeure). En mai, le chef historique des FARC, Manuel Marulanda, est décédé naturellement. Au milieu des frappes militaires, les FARC ont cherché à maintenir une initiative politique en favorisant les échanges humanitaires. Août Le président Uribe s'est incliné devant les pressions publiques, acceptant un débat animé par le président vénézuélien Hugo Chávez. Cependant, en 2007, Novembre Uribe achève la médiation pour Chávez. Les otages ont depuis été libérés par décision unilatérale des FARC (opération Emmanuel), par médiation au Venezuela ou lors d'opérations de sauvetage militaire (opération Jaque).

Bien que des pourparlers de paix formels avec les FARC n’aient pas été engagés sous la présidence Uribe, des contacts informels ont été établis en secret. En 2012, avec le début du processus de paix en cours, El Tiempo raconte comment Uribe avait poursuivi une "vision secrète des FARC à la recherche d'un processus de paix" jusqu'aux derniers moments de son second mandat.(9) 2013 Ancien médiateur suisse Jean Pierre & # 39; Uribe a ordonné trois petits cessez-le-feu unilatéraux pour faciliter les discussions entre les deux parties.(10)

2008 En juillet, après que l'armée colombienne ait sauvé 15 otages lors de l'opération Jaque, le gouvernement a pris contact avec les FARC, en particulier avec le nouveau dirigeant de l'organisation, Alfonso Cano, pour leur proposer une sortie "météo".(11) Après la fin du mandat d'Uribe en 2010 En janvier, Frank Pearl, haut-commissaire de la paix de l'époque, a déclaré à l'ambassadeur américain William Brownfield qu'il avait ouvert des voies de communication avec les FARC afin de renforcer la confiance et d'élaborer des plans d'action pour la prochaine administration.(12) 2010 Février Sous le câble diplomatique américain, les médiateurs se préparaient pour une réunion entre le gouvernement et les responsables des FARC en Suède.(11) Néanmoins, qu'en est-il d'un autre câble diplomatique américain depuis 2009? En février, le président Uribe, publié par Wikileaks, a exprimé son scepticisme quant à l’idée de parvenir à un accord de négociation avec les FARC lors d’une réunion avec le secrétaire d’État adjoint américain de l’époque, James Steinberg. Uribe a décidé que les FARC "ne négocieront jamais tant que le Venezuela n'aura pas un refuge sûr et un revenu stable du trafic de drogue".(13) En fait, les FARC ont soudainement mis fin au rapprochement de Pearl avec les FARC en rendant les restes humains du colonel Julián Guevara, emprisonnés pendant 12 ans, en 2010. Avril(14)

En ne traitant pas militairement avec eux, Uribe a grandement affaibli les chances de guerre des FARC et a détruit ses rangs. 2002 Les FARC comptaient plus de 20 700 hommes armés, tombant à un peu plus de 8 000 en 2010. Au cours de la même période, les attaques contre les colonies de peuplement, les attaques terroristes, les enlèvements et les meurtres ont considérablement diminué.(15) Selon le gouvernement colombien 2010-2014 Avec l'affaiblissement du plan de développement national, les FARC "sont revenues à la guerre de guérilla dans son expression essentielle: agir de manière sporadique et non coordonnée sur les forces de sécurité et intimider la population".(16)

2010 L'ancien ministre de la Défense, Juan Manuel Santos, a été élu président, soutenu par son soutien à Uribe et sur la base de sa promesse commune de renforcer davantage la politique de sécurité démocratique d'Uribe. 2010 En septembre, Santos a célébré la mort de Mono Jojoy, membre du secrétariat des FARC et chef militaire, au cours d’une opération militaire, qu’il qualifiait de la plus importante frappe partisane de son histoire.(17):194

Santos commença néanmoins à se distancer de son prédécesseur. Dans son discours inaugural, Santos a déclaré que la "porte du dialogue" n'était pas "verrouillée" et a clairement indiqué que son gouvernement serait ouvert au dialogue avec les groupes armés illégaux cherchant à négocier, même dans certaines conditions. 2011 L'administration Santos a travaillé d'arrache-pied pour obtenir la "loi 1448 de 2011 sur les victimes et la restauration des terres", approuvée par le Congrès, qui reconnaît officiellement les victimes des conflits armés et leur donne droit à une indemnisation, y compris le droit à la restitution de leurs terres. . Le président Santos a également cherché à améliorer les relations avec le Venezuela et l'Équateur, qui avaient été mis à rude épreuve lors du second mandat d'Uribe. À la suite de la conclusion des relations diplomatiques, Hugo Chávez a redéfini son approche des FARC et a commencé à défendre le processus d’accession à Cuba. Ainsi, le soutien étranger à la lutte armée des FARC était à un niveau historiquement bas, avec l’isolement diplomatique de la guérilla sur la scène internationale.(18)

Le processus de paix(Éditer)

Réunions exploratoires(Éditer)

2011 Plusieurs réunions exploratoires secrètes entre le gouvernement colombien et les FARC ont débuté au printemps. Les FARC signalent que la première de ces réunions a eu lieu en 2011. Mars Près de la frontière entre la Colombie et le Venezuela, représentation partisane de Rodrigo Granda (international clé des FARC) et Andrés París (théoricien politique et négociateur chevronné) et gouvernement conseillé par les conseillers présidentiels Alejandro Eder et Jaime Avendaño. Les deux autres réunions ont eu lieu jusqu'en juillet, lorsque les deux parties ont décidé de poursuivre leurs réunions de renseignements à La Havane, à Cuba.(19) Ces premiers contacts visaient à déterminer où, comment et quand la prochaine étape du processus aurait lieu: réunions secrètes pour établir l'ordre du jour des pourparlers. 2011 Juillet Le gouvernement a chargé des hauts fonctionnaires de participer au processus: Frank Pearl, ministre de l'Environnement par intérim; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, conseiller à la sécurité nationale auprès du président; et Enrique Santos, frère du président Santos, ancien El Tiempo. Pour le magazine SemanaL’inclusion d’Eduardo Santos était le "geste de confiance" du président Santos pour le partisan, sur la base des relations entre les deux hommes et de la participation antérieure d’Eduardo Santos à des dialogues partisans.(14) Mauricio Jaramillo et Marcos Calarcá se sont joints à l'équipe de négociation des FARC.

Malgré la mort du chef des FARC, Alfonso Cano, lors d’une opération militaire en 2011, En novembre, les négociations secrètes se sont poursuivies. Semana a signalé que les deux parties aux négociations sont convenues du principe selon lequel nul ne peut influencer le débat de l'extérieur,(14) et les FARC ont déclaré que leur direction centrale avait décidé de poursuivre les réunions du renseignement "parce que c'était la volonté d'Alfonso Cano".(19)

Une fois que les négociateurs ont été convenus, les deux parties ont commencé à nommer des pays garants étrangers. Accepter les réunions précédentes était le choix logique et la Norvège a été choisie comme deuxième pays garant pour son rôle actif dans la médiation des conflits. En outre, deux médiateurs ou "accompagnants" ont été nommés. Le Venezuela a été choisi par les FARC et le Chili par le gouvernement colombien.(14) Les réunions de reconnaissance se sont poursuivies en 2012. Février À La Havane, avec des échanges sociaux limités, les échanges entre les deux groupes de négociation ont pour but de préserver la confidentialité des négociations. Jusqu'en 2012 Août Près de dix phases préparatoires ont été organisées, chacune d’une durée de quatre à huit jours, totalisant environ 65 réunions entre les deux parties. Les cinq orateurs des deux côtés sont restés à Cuba pendant le processus.(14)

2012 En février, en tant que premier "geste de paix" public, les FARC ont annoncé dans un communiqué qu’elles préviendraient désormais l’extorsion de fonds, qui a été "légalisée" par ses autorités. ley 002 En l'an 2000.(20)

2012 Août L'ancien président Álvaro Uribe, qui est devenu un critique majeur de l'administration Santos, a confirmé que le gouvernement négocie avec les FARC à Cuba. Le ministre de la Défense, Juan Carlos Pinzón, et la ministre des Affaires étrangères, María Ángela Holguín, ont nié ces accusations.(21) Mais le 27 août. TeleSUR a annoncé que le gouvernement et les FARC étaient sur le point d'annoncer un accord pour l'ouverture de pourparlers de paix formels, et le président Santos a confirmé cette information par la suite.(22)

Dans une annonce télévisée du 4 septembre. Santos a annoncé la signature d'un "accord-cadre" fixant les règles et l'agenda des pourparlers de paix. Il a souligné que "les erreurs du passé ne se reproduiront pas" sans dénonciation de territoire, interruption des opérations militaires et tenue de pourparlers de paix en dehors de la Colombie avec le soutien de la communauté internationale.(23)

2012 Septembre – décembre: Accord-cadre, délégations et dialogues(Éditer)

Accord-cadre pour la cessation des conflits et l'instauration d'une paix stable et durable (Principe général de conflit et de conception d'Acuerdo) signé par des représentants du gouvernement colombien et des FARC 26 août À la Havane, à Cuba. L’accord définit un plan pour l’instauration d’un processus de paix officiel, les modalités de conduite des négociations et un programme thématique en cinq points.

Les six questions thématiques abordées sont le développement rural intégral, la participation politique, la fin du conflit (y compris la cessation bilatérale et définitive des hostilités et la cessation des hostilités et la remise des armes), la résolution des problèmes liés aux drogues illicites et aux victimes; ratification, mise en oeuvre et vérification.

Par convention, chaque délégation est composée de 30 personnes au maximum, dont 10 réunions et 5 représentants autorisés. Les discussions à la table des négociations sont privées mais des rapports périodiques et un mécanisme est développé pour obtenir des offres des individus et des organisations. L'un des principes directeurs des négociations était que "rien n'était convenu tant que tout n'était pas convenu".(24)

Par rapport aux processus de paix précédents, le processus de paix actuel a été lancé avec un ordre du jour défini qui abordait un nombre limité de questions. De plus, c’était le premier processus de paix avec les FARC, qui énonçait clairement la «fin du conflit» et l’arme remise par la guérilla comme objectif final.(25)

La délégation du gouvernement colombien est dirigée par l'ancien vice-président Humberto de la Calle, négociateur en chef, accompagnée du Haut commissaire à la paix, Sergio Jaramillo, ainsi que par Frank Pearl, directeur commercial, Luis Carlos Villegas, Enrique Santos Calderón, Alejandro Éder, général à la retraite. Le policier national Óscar Naranjo et le général d'armée à la retraite Jorge Enrique Mora. La délégation des FARC est dirigée par Iván Márquez, négociateur en chef, avec Jesús Santrich, Rodrigo Granda, Andrés París, Marcos Calarcá, Mauricio Jaramillo, Pablo Catatumbo, Tanja Nijmeijer et Simón Trinidad (actuellement en prison aux États-Unis).(26)

Des pourparlers de paix ont été officiellement mis en place à Oslo, en Norvège, en 2012. 18 octobre et novembre. Déménagé à La Havane.(27) Discours du négociateur en chef des FARC, Ivan Márquez, en octobre Lors du dialogue à Oslo, les médias colombiens l'ont interprétée comme radicalement inattendue dans sa position offensive contre le gouvernement, évoquant des questions hors du programme (modèle économique, investissement étranger, doctrine militaire, mines, propriété foncière) et défendant la lutte armée.(28)

2012 20 novembre Les FARC ont déclaré un cessez-le-feu unilatéral jusqu'en 2013 20 janvier Les partisans l'ont proclamée comme "une contribution importante au renforcement du climat de compréhension nécessaire au dialogue entre les parties et à la réalisation de l'objectif recherché par tous les Colombiens. . "(29)

Le processus de paix a été soutenu par d’éminents gouvernements de gauche en Amérique latine. Dans une déclaration récente en 2012, Octobre Le président Hugo Chávez a cherché à rejoindre les FARC dans un processus politique pacifique. Le président équatorien, Rafael Correa, a déclaré que le processus de paix était un moment opportun pour permettre aux FARC de déployer des armes.
Président bolivien Evo Morales Décembre Il a ajouté que les FARC devaient "échanger leurs balles contre des voix".(30)

Année 2013(Éditer)

Bien que le débat ait eu lieu au premier point de l'ordre du jour (développement rural inextricablement lié), la plus grande crise du processus de paix s'est produite en 2013. Janvier À la fin – après le 25 janvier. Les FARC ont enlevé deux policiers à Valle del Cauca. À la suite de cet événement, les FARC ont pris une embuscade le 31 janvier. quatre soldats du département de Nariño ont été tués et le 1er février. trois autres policiers du département de La Guajira ont été tués. Les FARC ont déclaré que ces actions constituaient des représailles contre un bombardement militaire qui a eu lieu. Au cours du cessez-le-feu unilatéral des FARC (qui a pris fin le 20 janvier), 20 guérilleros ont été tués. Les négociateurs gouvernementaux à La Havane ont déclaré que de telles actions minaient le processus de paix. En amenant la guerre à la table des négociations, les deux parties ont rompu leur compréhension de ne pas laisser les événements du conflit affecter le processus et le différend a dégénéré en une guerre de mots entre les deux parties. Le gouvernement, sous la pression de l'opposition féroce de l'ancien président Uribe au processus de paix, a vivement averti les FARC qu'il réagirait de la même manière et qu'il ne subirait aucune pression pour discuter d'un cessez-le-feu bilatéral (comme le soulignent les FARC).(31)

Malgré ces difficultés, les négociations sur le premier point se sont poursuivies. Mars Une délégation de six membres du Congrès s'est rendue à La Havane pour rencontrer les négociateurs des FARC. La réunion a été décrite comme productive et respectueuse. Le sénateur Roy Barreras (Partido de la U) a annoncé que le processus de paix avançait et avait atteint des étapes jamais atteintes par les processus de paix antérieurs.(32) 26 mai Les deux parties ont annoncé un accord partiel sur le premier point, une réforme rurale globale. L'accord portait principalement sur les questions d'accès et d'utilisation des terres, de terres non productives, de droits de propriété, de développement rural, d'infrastructures, de développement social rural, d'agriculture et d'élevage, d'assistance technique, de subventions et de crédits, d'alimentation et de nutrition.(27)

En dépit de ces réalisations, un nouveau point de divergence important apparaît entre le gouvernement et les FARC: ce dernier insiste pour que l'Assemblée constituante mette en œuvre les résultats de l'accord final. Pour la guérilla, l’Assemblée constituante était le seul moyen de changer le régime politique et de réformer les institutions politiques, mais le gouvernement continuait de s’opposer fermement à l’idée d’un amendement constitutionnel. Plusieurs membres du gouvernement, dirigés par le négociateur en chef Humberto de la Calle, ont clairement exprimé l'opposition du gouvernement à l'assemblée constituante. Afin de ratifier l'accord final, le gouvernement a proposé une forme existante de participation civique – consultation populaire, référendum ou plébiscite.(33) 2013 Août Le gouvernement a déposé un projet de loi visant à organiser les référendums constitutionnels nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de l'accord final dans l'espoir de le maintenir. Élections au Congrès (mars) ou présidentielles (mai), qui nécessiteront la signature d'un accord final. L'accord sera conclu en 2013. fin. Les FARC se sont opposées à la conclusion à court terme des pourparlers par le gouvernement afin de former une réunion constitutive et ont déclaré une "pause" dans les pourparlers.(27)(34) Bien que les négociations se soient finalement poursuivies, la déception suscitée par la lenteur du processus et le second tour de 2014. Les campagnes électorales ont conduit les médias à spéculer sur la possibilité d'arrêter ou même d'interrompre les discussions.(35)

Le processus de paix a été dynamisé le 6 novembre. Après l’annonce d’un accord partiel sur le deuxième point de l’ordre du jour – la participation politique (sans résoudre la question de l’Assemblée constituante).(27) 2013 15 décembre Les FARC annoncent un deuxième cessez-le-feu temporaire unilatéral, valable jusqu'en 2014 14 janvier(36)

2013 Le processus de paix en Colombie a bénéficié d'un large soutien de la part de la communauté internationale et des dirigeants mondiaux, notamment l'ancien président américain Bill Clinton, l'ancien Premier ministre espagnol Felipe González, l'ancien Premier ministre britannique Tony Blair, le président portugais Aníbal Cavaco Silva et le président allemand Joachim Gauck.(37)

Année 2014(Éditer)

2014 Février Les pourparlers ont été entachés par des sondages déposés par Semanaalléguant que le service de renseignement militaire avait illégalement suivi des communications privées entre les négociateurs du gouvernement à La Havane.(38) Le président Juan Manuel Santos a déclaré la prise de contrôle illégale "inacceptable" et ordonné une enquête publique afin de déterminer si les "forces obscures" tentaient de saboter le processus de paix. Quelques jours plus tard, deux généraux, dont le chef du renseignement militaire, ont été licenciés et le bureau du procureur général a ouvert une enquête.(39)

Un accord partiel sur un autre point de l'ordre du jour – les drogues illicites – a été atteint en 2014. 16 mai Mais les événements de La Havane ont été éclipsés par les élections au Congrès (le 9 mars) et les élections à deux tours (mai). 25 et 15 juin). L’ancien président Álvaro Uribe, principal opposant au processus de paix, avait fondé son propre parti, le Centre démocratique (Centro Democrático, CD) et a dirigé la liste au Sénat de son parti en mars. La liste dirigée par Uribe a recueilli plus de 2 millions de voix et 20 sièges, formant un bloc d'opposition puissant dans la nouvelle législature, même si les partis de la paix ont maintenu la majorité dans les deux chambres du Congrès. Le processus de paix est devenu l'un des points clés de la course à la présidence, la paix promise étant au cœur de la campagne de réélection du président Santos, et Óscar Iván Zuluaga, candidat du Centre démocratique d'Uribe, s'est opposé au processus de paix. Zuluaga a déclaré qu'il suspendrait les pourparlers de paix jusqu'à ce que les FARC se mettent d'accord sur un cessez-le-feu unilatéral permanent et vérifiable dans un délai de 8 jours, dont les termes étaient irréalistes.(40) En outre, Zuluaga a déclaré qu'il n'existait pas de conflit armé mais plutôt une "menace terroriste" et que des problèmes tels que la réforme agraire et les drogues illicites ne pourraient pas être traités avec les FARC, le "principal cartel de la drogue dans le monde". Au lieu de promettre "une paix sans impunité", M. Zuluaga a annoncé son intention de réduire les peines de prison pour les auteurs de crimes contre l'humanité, mais que l'éligibilité politique était limitée aux partisans et non aux commandants.(41)

Zuluaga s'est bien comporté au premier tour, devançant le président Santos (25,72%) en première place (29,28%). Lors de son second tour, le président sortant a doublé le problème de la paix et présenté des élections comme un choix entre paix ou guerre sans fin et a formé avec succès une large coalition pacifique appuyée par la gauche et le centre-gauche, notamment Clara López, candidate de premier tour au pôle alternatif de gauche. 21%), mais aussi son 2010. son rival Antanas Mockus et le maire de l'aile gauche de Bogota, Gustavo Petro. Zuluagai a été soutenu par Martha Lucía Ramírez, candidate conservatrice du premier tour (15,52%). À la suite de l’alliance avec Ramírez, Zuluaga a modéré sa position dans le processus de paix en acceptant de poursuivre les négociations dans certaines conditions, en tenant compte de ce qui avait été convenu et des "signes tangibles de paix" du partisan.(40) Santos a été réélu en juin à 51% et Zuluaga à 45%.

Les FARC annoncent deux cessez-le-feu unilatéraux lors des premier et deuxième tours de l'élection présidentielle du 20 au 28 mai. De nouveau, du 9 au 30 juin.(36)

Août La première réunion de 12 victimes et négociateurs du conflit a eu lieu à La Havane, un échange solennel très symbolique et solennel de victimes avec leurs victimes.(42) Dans la déclaration commune susmentionnée, les deux parties ont réaffirmé que les victimes de l'accord constituaient la base. Une deuxième délégation de victimes a été reçue en septembre. Malgré ces rencontres, les FARC, estimant qu’elles n’étaient pas suffisamment prises en compte, ont organisé un forum permettant aux victimes de prendre en compte leurs votes. Le forum a réuni des opposants et des partisans du processus de paix.(43)

À partir de juillet Une série d'attaques des FARC a durement frappé les civils – des bombardements ont détruit des pylônes électriques, laissé Buenaventur sans électricité, des routes défoncées et des canalisations d'eau pendant plusieurs jours dans des eaux vives ou par des moyens de communication, une attaque à la grenade contre un policier a tué sa fille , et les guérillas de Putumay ont forcé les pétroliers à vider le pétrole qu’ils transportaient. Le président Santos a averti les FARC qu'ils jouaient avec le feu et que de telles actions ne pourraient durer éternellement. De leur côté, les FARC ont menacé de quitter la table des négociations si le gouvernement continuait à tuer ses commandants. Les FARC ont également intensifié leur rhétorique: Pablo Catatumbo a accusé l’État de la grande majorité des victimes du conflit et a justifié les enlèvements, tandis que le chef des FARC, Timochenko, a déclaré dans un communiqué que les médias demandaient trop aux partisans pour faire face à leurs victimes et demander pardon.(44) En dépit de ces développements, les négociations se sont poursuivies à La Havane avec la création de la Commission historique sur le conflit et ses victimes, l’accord devant constituer un débat parallèle sur la "fin du conflit" et la création d’un sous-comité chargé des questions de parité. À la fin du mois de septembre, le Président Santos a annoncé à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies que le gouvernement avait décidé de rendre publics les accords conclus jusqu'à présent à La Havane, notamment des projets d'accords partiels conjoints sur la réforme rurale globale, les drogues illicites et la participation politique. Le gouvernement a déclaré qu'il s'agissait d'une mesure de transparence qui mettrait un terme aux spéculations et aux rumeurs concernant le contenu des accords partisans.

16 novembre Le général Rubén Darío Alzate, commandant de la force opérationnelle interarmées du Titán, a été enlevé par les FARC. Alzat a été le premier général à être occupé par la guérilla dans l'histoire du conflit armé. Le président Santos a ordonné aux négociateurs du gouvernement de ne pas se rendre à La Havane tant que les otages n'auraient pas été libérés, tandis que les FARC insisteraient sur les conséquences politiques de l'enlèvement et s'en serviraient pour exiger un cessez-le-feu bilatéral. 30 novembre, par l'intermédiaire de Garanties intermédiaires et de la Croix-Rouge internationale. Les pirates de l'air des FARC ont libéré le général Alzate et l'ont remis à la Croix-Rouge.(45)(46) En raison de l'enlèvement du général Alzate, les deux côtés de La Havane se réunissent le 12 décembre. Les négociations pour intensifier le conflit ont commencé. 17 décembre Les FARC ont annoncé dans un communiqué qu'elles annonceraient un cessez-le-feu unilatéral, qui commencerait le 20 décembre. prendrait fin si les autorités attaquaient les fronts de la guérilla. C’était le cinquième cessez-le-feu unilatéral des FARC depuis 2012. Et le premier est indéfini.(27)(36)

2015 Janvier – août: crise et escalade(Éditer)

À partir de 2015 Janvier à avril Les pourparlers de paix à La Havane ont montré des signes de progrès constants et d’un soutien international croissant. 20 février Le secrétaire d'Etat américain John Kerry a annoncé la nomination de Bernard Aronson au poste d'envoyé spécial pour le processus de paix colombien. Cette nomination a été bien accueillie, y compris par les FARC, et a été interprétée comme une approbation claire du processus de paix colombien aux États-Unis, qui a longtemps été un acteur étranger clé du conflit colombien. 27 février L'ancien Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, Kofi Annan, s'est rendu à la table des négociations à La Havane.(27) 7 mars À Cuba, les parties aux négociations ont annoncé la création d’un projet pilote de déminage visant à défricher et à décontaminer les terrains contaminés par les mines antipersonnel, les engins explosifs improvisés et les munitions non explosées, sous la direction et la coordination des dirigeants norvégiens. Aide populaire.(47) Cette annonce était importante parce que les FARC s'étaient engagées à déminer et à mettre un terme à la construction de nouvelles mines dans la région. Il s'agissait du premier aspect des pourparlers de paix qui auront un impact direct sur le territoire.(48) Le projet pilote a été lancé dans la municipalité de Briceño, Antioquia.

10 mars À la télévision, le président Santos a reconnu que les FARC s'étaient prononcés en faveur d'un cessez-le-feu unilatéral et, dans le but de mettre fin au conflit, a ordonné au ministère de la Défense et aux commandants militaires d'arrêter de bombarder les camps des FARC. pendant un mois.

Le 15 avril, 11 soldats ont été tués dans une embuscade organisée par les FARC dans le Cauca. Cette crise menaçait l’avenir du processus de paix et laissait beaucoup de gens perplexes sur la raison pour laquelle les FARC avaient apparemment saboté le processus de désescalade. The FARC negotiators in Havana justified the attack saying that the army had been advancing with reinforcements against a guerrilla camp, and denounced 'premeditated attacks' by the military but deplored the loss of life and reiterated their demands for a bilateral ceasefire.(27) President Santos responded immediately by ordering bombings to resume. Within the government, the idea of imposing a deadline for an agreement grew in popularity, supported by Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras and even by strong supporters of the peace process like senator Horacio Serpa and interior minister Juan Fernando Cristo. President Santos also mentioned the idea in a speech on April 17.(49)

The death of the 11 soldiers turned public opinion against the peace process and boosted the popularity of its main opponent, Álvaro Uribe. In an Ipsos poll, Santos' approval fell from 40% to 29% compared to November 2014, pessimism in the peace process increased 16 points to 69% during the same period and former President Uribe's favourable image increased from 41% to 57%. Nevertheless, only 27% of respondents in the poll wanted to break off dialogues and launch a military offensive. For a skeptical public, the FARC's attack was a sign that their ceasefire had been deceitful and only heightened frustration with a peace process which had recorded no formal agreement since May 2014.(50) However, according to the Conflict analysis resource centre (Cerac), the attack on the soldiers was the only severe violation of the ceasefire, given that the FARC had generally complied with their ceasefire up to that point, resulting in the lowest levels of violence in the conflict since 1984.(51)

As a retaliation for the attack in the Cauca, a military operation in Guapi, Cauca killed 26 guerrillas of the FARC's 29th front on May 22. Days later, guerrilla commander and general staff member Román Ruiz was killed in the Chocó. The FARC called off their unilateral ceasefire declared in December 2014.(52) Although it had been agreed upon that negotiations would take place in the midst of continued conflict, the end of the FARC's unilateral ceasefire was seen as putting the peace process in a critical moment which would lead to its end if not handled cautiously. Combined with President Santos' historically low popularity, the negotiations' loss of credibility and the strength of Uribe's opposition to the peace progress, the Havana talks appeared to be in dire straits.(53) The crisis worried Cuba and Norway, the two guarantor countries, who called on the two sides to continue efforts at a negotiated settlement including an agreement on a definite bilateral ceasefire.(27)

The government shuffled its negotiating team in Havana. Luis Carlos Villegas was appointed Minister of Defence and left the negotiating team, replacing Juan Carlos Pinzón who was sent as ambassador to the United States. Foreign minister María Ángela Holguín was integrated into the negotiating team, as was Gonzalo Restrepo, former president of the Grupo Éxito.(54)

Following the end of the ceasefire, both sides made small gestures of peace, with Santos ordering that the bodies of guerrillas killed in combat be identified and returned to their families while the FARC reiterated their will to remain in the negotiations. A technical sub-commission for the end of the conflict began discussions about confidence-building measures, while the mine clearance pilot project began in Briceño (Antioquia), with Humberto de la Calle highlighting the historic nature of the military and the FARC working alongside one another. The FARC's negotiators in Havana and their leader, Timochenko, adopted a conciliatory tone. Analysts opined that the talks had reached a point of maturity where both sides appreciated their common objective and jointly protect what has been accomplished.(55) On June 4, the negotiating sides created a commission for the clarification of truth, coexistence and non-repetition – the basis for an extrajudicial truth commission on the victims of the conflict.(27)

In Colombia, however, a wave of attacks by the FARC in June seemed to undo the progress made in Havana. Sabotage to energy infrastructure left Buenaventura and Tumaco without electricity, 13,000 barrels of oil were spilled in Putumayo, a power pylon in Caquetá was bombed and a police colonel was assassinated in Ipiales. These attacks left over one million people without electricity, and the attacks against oil infrastructure created an environmental catastrophe. With these actions, the FARC had sought to regain the military initiative after the hits they suffered from the military in May and put political pressure on the government, but analysts judged that the guerrilla had miscalculated as it had further reduced their credibility in the eyes of the public.(56)

Cuba and Norway, the guarantor countries, placed pressure on both sides to begin de-escalating the conflict. The FARC responded, on July 8, by announcing a one-month unilateral ceasefire from July 20 (it has since been declared indefinite), and adding that they fully remained behind the peace process. Consideration of a bilateral ceasefire remained a more difficult question. On July 12, the government and the FARC negotiators in a joint communiqué entitled "Expedite in Havana and de-escalate in Colombia" announced a major agreement to de-escalate the conflict. Each delegation agreed to move towards a final agreement without delay by changing the format (to "a technical, ongoing and simultaneous work on the core items of the Agenda, while concurrently building agreements at the Table"), in particular on the terms of the final bilateral ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and surrender of weapons. Without agreeing to an immediate bilateral ceasefire, the government set in motion a de-escalation process of military actions consistent with the FARC's suspension of all offensive actions.(57) In August, despite the unpopularity of the move, Santos ordered the suspension of bombings against the FARC.

September—December 2015: Agreement on a Special Jurisdiction for Peace(Redaguoti)

On September 23, the government and the FARC reached an historic agreement on transitional justice (Special Jurisdiction for Peace or Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz). Adding to the historic nature of the agreement, President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC commander Timoleón Jiménez "Timochenko" travelled to Havana for the announcement, the first public encounter between a sitting President of Colombia and the commander of the FARC. The presidential delegation included the President of the Congress and Senate Luis Fernando Velasco, the President of the Chamber of Representatives Alfredo Deluque, senator and Liberal leader Horacio Serpa, senator Antonio Navarro Wolff (himself a demobilized guerrilla from the M-19) and senator Iván Cepeda as well as Juan Carlos Henao and Manuel José Cepeda, former judges of the Constitutional Court who had played a major role in working out the agreement. The meeting ended with an unscripted handshake between President Santos and Timochenko, overlooked by Cuban President Raúl Castro. Simultaneously with the agreement, the government also announced that a final agreement would be signed within six months, or by March 23, 2016.(58)

The agreement on transitional justice was the result of lengthy discussions between government and guerrilla lawyers in Havana and Bogotá, which had begun in July working under Santos' ultimatum to reach such an agreement by November at the latest. Facing an impasse in Havana, the negotiators delegated the file to a group of six respected jurists – Spanish lawyer Enrique Santiago, Conservative politician Álvaro Leyva, human rights advocate Diego Martínez, former judge Manuel José Cepeda, University of Notre Dame professor Douglass Cassel and rector of the Universidad Externado de Colombia Juan Carlos Henao; the first three selected by the FARC, the latter three by the government. By September, the team of six had a text ready to be announced in Havana.(59)

The September 23 agreement on transitional justice was considered the most important moment in the peace process to date, because it resolved one of the most complicated issues through a formula satisfactory to both the guerrilla and the government, combining restorative justice with alternative sentences for guerrillas and agents of the State who have committeed crimes against humanity with amnesty for those responsible of political crimes. With the agreement, the peace process was considered to be 'irreversible'.

The announcement received acclaim internationally. Secretary of State John Kerry effusively praised the agreement, with his words even being relayed by FARC chief negotiator Iván Marquez's Twitter account. Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, "noted with optimism that the agreement excludes the granting of amnesties for war crimes and crimes against humanity and is designed, among other things, to end immunity for the most serious crimes."(60) However, Human Rights Watch criticized the agreement, saying that it would exempt those responsible for the worst abuses from spending even a single day in jail, a view shared in Colombia by Álvaro Uribe. In Colombia, the announcement was greeted with cautious optimism. An Ipsos poll in October showed optimism in the peace process increasing from 29% to 46% since July, although majorities of respondents continued to doubt the FARC's commitment to peace and oppose their political participation.(61)

In mid-October, the negotiators announced immediate humanitarian measures for the search, location, identification and delivery of the remains of missing persons and the creation of a search unit for disappeared persons.(62)

The six-month window given to reach an agreement already appeared difficult to meet in November, due to delays in closing the transitional justice issue which became paralyzed despite the September 23 announcements because of different interpretations on thorny details between the two sides.(63)

On December 15, the final agreement on the fifth item of the agenda (victims), which includes transitional justice, was finally announced by the negotiating parties in Cuba. It built on the truth commission, the September 23 agreement on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, as well as the October announcements on the search unit for disappeared persons.(27)

Disagreements between the government and the FARC continued on the mechanism for ratification of a final agreement. In November, the government gave its support to a bill submitted by senator Roy Barreras (Partido de la U) organizing a plebiscite on a final agreement. In Havana, the FARC responded negatively to the idea of the plebiscite, insisting on a constituent assembly.(64) With the support of the government's congressional majority, the bill regulating the plebiscite was adopted by Congress in December 2015. As per the statutory law regulating the plebiscite, approval requires support equivalent to 13% of the registered electorate for the winning option, a one-time exception to the existing law regulating plebiscites (Law 1757 of 2015) which has a turnout quorum of 50%. The reduction of the quorum, and the change from a turnout threshold to a decision threshold, was controversial. Additionally, in the plebiscite voters would vote on the final agreement as a whole rather than article-by-article, something which also created some criticisms, primarily from Uribe's Democratic Centre. Following its adoption by Congress, the law passed to the Constitutional Court for a mandatory revision.(65)

2016: Final Agreement(Redaguoti)

Another significant step towards achieving a final agreement was made on January 19, with the announcement of a trilateral mechanism for the verification and monitoring of a final ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and surrender of weapons composed of the government, the FARC and a political mission of the United Nations composed by observers from member states of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The international component would preside and coordinate the mechanism. In other words, the negotiators asked the United Nations Security Council to create such a political mission with unarmed observers for a renewable 12-month period.(66) The decision was highlighted by negotiators from both sides as an historic step towards the end of the conflict and confirmation of both parties' commitment to peace. Peace commissioner Sergio Jaramillo said that, with the UN Security Council involved, the government and the FARC would have to fulfill their obligations. FARC Secretariat member Carlos Antonio Losada, in an interview with Semana, noted that the bilateral ceasefire had been installed on the ground by the force of events and that no one would accept that this situation be reversed, specially with the UN involved. President Santos had previously contacted the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to secure their support, and the FARC had been convinced following consultations with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.(67)

In early February, the government and the FARC once again found themselves at odds, on the issue of the plebiscite. The FARC, by communiqué, argued that the plebiscite contravened the general agreement (from August 2012). In response, President Santos tweeted that the final agreement in Havana would be submitted to plebiscite, whether the FARC liked it or not.(68) In late February, the FARC's 'armed proselytism' during a 'political pedagogy' event (attended by Iván Marquez and other negotiators) in La Guajira stirred significant controversy. Since 2015, the FARC's negotiators had been authorized by the government to travel to Colombia to organize 'political pedagogy' events with their troops only, and till then all such activities had occurred without major problems. However, the presence of armed men mingling with the civilian population during this particular event in La Guajira rekindled fears about the use of weapons by the guerrilla during political events. President Santos notified the guerrilla that 'political pedagogy' events were suspended until further notice and issued an ultimatum that either a final agreement is signed on March 23 or it would be understood that the FARC are not ready for peace. Semana considered the incident as a major blow to confidence and trust in the peace process, which came at a critical moment.(69)

Due to continued disagreements, the March 23 deadline for a final agreement announced six months prior passed without any such agreement being announced. It had been hoped that a final agreement could coincide with President Barack Obama's historic visit to Cuba on March 20. Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry met with both peace delegations while in Cuba, reiterating the Obama administration's support for the peace process and the post-conflict.(70)

On May 12, an agreement to provide legal security to the final agreement was reached. Once signed, the final agreement would be considered as a special agreement under the terms of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and form part of the Constitution of Colombia's constitutionality bloc (as international humanitarian law). The government would present before Congress an ordinary law to approve the final agreement as a special agreement, Congress would approve or reject it as a whole within 8 days and the Constitutional Court would review it. Afterwards, the government would present a constitutional amendment (legislative act) to incorporate the text of the final agreement to the Constitution as a transitory article. Finally, after signature of the final agreement, the President would make a unilateral declaration in the name of the Colombian State before the Secretary General of the UN, relating the final agreement to Resolution 2261 of January 25, 2016.(71)(72) The announcement ensured legal security to the agreement, increasing the FARC's confidence that the agreements would be followed – constitutional entrenchment of a final agreement would protect it from future changes in political conditions, and commit the Colombian government before the international community. By agreeing to this procedure, the FARC signalled their acceptance of the political institutions which it had rejected and fought against for decades. At the same time, without yet endorsing the plebiscite itself, the FARC indicated that the final agreement would be submitted for popular ratification, and thereby implicitly dropped their insistence on a constituent assembly as an implementation mechanism.(73) The details of the agreement on legal security sparked legal controversy in Colombia. Álvaro Uribe called it a coup d'état, while Inspector General Alejandro Ordóñez, another major critic of the peace process, wrote a letter to Santos in which he accused him of wishing to replacing the Constitution in tandem with the FARC and threatened him with disciplinary action. However, lawyers not necessarily opposed to the peace process also raised questions about the legality of the measures detailed in the May 12 agreement, such as the incorporation of the final agreement into constitutional jurisprudence.(74)

Three days later, the negotiating parties announced an agreement on the release of minors under 15 years of age from FARC camps as well as a road map for the release of all other minors and a special program for their care. On June 10, the creation of an illicit crop substitution pilot project in Briceño (where the mine clearance pilot project was organized) was announced from Cuba.(27)

On June 23, the government and the FARC signed historic agreements on the 'end of the conflict' including the bilateral ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and surrender of weapons during a ceremony in Havana, Cuba. The signature of the agreements was overseen by the guarantor countries (Cuba and Norway) and attended by President Juan Manuel Santos; FARC commander 'Timochenko'; UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; Cuban President Raúl Castro, the host; Michelle Bachelet, President of Chile (accompanying country); Nicolás Maduro, President of Venezuela (accompanying country); Norwegian foreign minister Børge Brende; Danilo Medina, President of the Dominican Republic (president pro tempore of CELAC); Salvador Sánchez Cerén, President of El Salvador; Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico; and representatives of the European Union and the United States.(75)

The June 23 agreement laid down the modalities for the bilateral and definite ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, which would begin following the signature of the final agreement. Five days following the signature of the final agreement and following the redeployment of troops, the FARC would begin moving to 23 transitory rural settlement normalization zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización) and 8 encampments for the purposes of delivering their weapons to the UN mission and prepare for their reincorporation into civilian life. While the normal functioning of unarmed elected civilian authorities within these zones would not be impeded, no civilian population would be allowed to reside in the zones and access would be restricted. A 1 kilometre wide security zone, off limits to both soldiers and guerrilla, would surround each zone. The FARC would designate a group of 60 members to travel throughout the national territory in performance of tasks related to the peace agreement; likewise, within each zone, a group of 10 members of the guerrilla would travel within the municipality and department for the same reasons. The UN would collect and store all weapons received from the FARC, which would later be used to build three monuments. The guerrilla would surrender their weapons gradually in three phases over 180 days from the signature of the final agreement, and the UN mission would certify the process. The announcement offered further details about the tripartite monitoring and verification mechanism, with the international component (the UN political mission) presiding the mechanism, resolving controversies and presenting recommendations and reports about the ceasefire and surrender of weapons.

In addition to the above, the negotiating parties also announced an agreement on security guarantees, aimed at ensuring the safety of social movements, communities, human rights groups, political parties and movements (especially the political movement to be created by the FARC in their reintegration to civilian life). Symbolically, this agreement includes a 'national political pact' with political parties, unions and civil society to guarantee that never again will weapons be used in pursuit of politics goals, or violent organizations promoted.(76)(77)

Unexpectedly, on June 23, it was also announced that the FARC had agreed to support the decision to be rendered by the Constitutional Court on the plebiscite – in short, the FARC explicitly agreed to the plebiscite as the ratification mechanism for the final agreement. Prior to the June 23 announcements, Constitutional Court judge Luis Ernesto Vargas had already submitted a positive report (ponencia) on the plebiscite.(78)

On July 19, the Constitutional Court ruled the plebiscite ratifying the final agreement to be constitutional.(79) A final agreement between the FARC and the government was announced from Havana on August 24, with the full text of the final agreement – at 297 pages – being published later that evening.(80)(81)

Ratification(Redaguoti)

The final agreement was submitted to popular ratification in a plebiscite on October 2, 2016.(82) It failed with 50.2% voting against it and 49.8% voting in favor, on a 37.4% turnout.(83)(84) Notably, Colombians living in regions that were hardest hit by the conflict, including displaced Colombians abroad, voted in favor while inland and urban areas that were more insulated voted in larger numbers against it.(85)

Following the failure of the referendum, the Colombian government and the FARC, on November 24, signed a revised agreement.(1) Colombia's congress approved the revised peace accord.(2) It was then submitted to Congress for approval. On 29 November, the Senate approved the deal 75-0 and the House of Representatives approved it the next day by a vote of 130-0 despite former President Alvaro Uribe's supporters boycotting the session.(86) Santos welcomed the resolution, while Sergio Jaramillo, the government's peace commissioner, said: "This last part of renegotiation was exhausting. It took us to the limit. But now we pass to something more difficult, which is to change the conditions on the ground and benefit our campesinos. And to assure there is safe transit for the FARC and to worry about the security of communities. (We seek) no more political deaths in Colombia." Uribe's supporters accused the government of giving away too many rights, including FARC's ability to form a political party.(2) The deal now means FARC members were go to designated transitional zones within five days and hand over its weapons to the United Nations representatives within the next six months. They would also be able to form a political party.(86)

The country's highest court ruled in favor of the government's “fast-track” plan to quickly implement the agreement. The government can move laws needed to carry out the country's peace deal with the Marxist FARC rebels through Congress more quickly than usual.(87)(88)

Women's involvement(Redaguoti)

"As the organizations convening the Summit, we told the negotiators in Havana that we did not want peace to be made for us, but to be the peacemakers."

— Marina Gallego, coordinator of the grass-roots organization Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres.(89)

The Colombian peace negotiations in Havana have had higher than average women's participation – at times, one-third of delegates in Havana have been women, above global averages.(90) The General Agreement that guided the process recognized that the negotiations "require the participation of all, without distinction." When, one year into talks, women and their concerns remained largely absent from the table, women's organizations began to push for greater inclusion. In October 2013, nearly 450 women from across Colombia gathered in Bogota at the National Summit of Women and Peace to demand inclusion in the peace process.

Two weeks after the National Summit, an agreement was reached in Havana on political participation, wherein both parties formally recognized the important role that women play in conflict-prevention, conflict-resolution, and peacebuilding. Subsequently, President Santos appointed two women with greater decision-making power on behalf of the Colombian Government at the talks. In August 2014, delegations of survivors of the conflict addressed negotiating parties, 60% of whom were women. This may be the first time that women negotiating on both sides of the table met with women affected by conflict. Representatives of women's organizations and the LGBTI community also addressed negotiators as gender experts.(90)

The equal participation in the construction, implementation, verification and countersignature of the agreements reached in the Dialogues of Havana are subject of concern of women's organizations that historically have worked for peace and human rights in the country. The Red de Mujeres (1995), the Ruta Pacífica (1996), and the Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz (2002) are some platforms that have targeted, among other issues, to the bilateral cease of fire, demilitarization of civil life, equitable land distribution, respect for human body, justice and differential approaches.
By the time when the peace process began with the FARC, Colombia's women already had a consolidated work in various peace agendas. Therefore, organizations around the country wrote open letters to the government demanding equal participation, supported by UN Women.

Before finishing 2012, when began the negotiating of the principle of the end of armed confrontation with the oldest Latin American guerrillas, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams, sent a letter to Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, claiming a space for women in Havana.

With the intention that there were not more agreements without the gender perspective, at the end of October 2013 took place in Bogotá the National Summit of Women for Peace, where was a national agenda consolidated, where around 500 women from 30 of the 32 departments representations. With the motto “las mujeres no queremos ser pactadas, sino ser pactantes” (Women do not want to be agreed, but be Covenanters)," the 800 proposals that were built were given to the government delegation.

In November, the summit published its declaration “Peace and democracy with women suit” where the experience of the Summit was collected. Proposals insisted on equal participation, demilitarization, bilateral cease, dismantling of paramilitary structures, truth, justice and reparation for all victims and "continue to build peace from the regions and from the everyday, strengthening the experiences of women as peacebuilders".

In September 2014, a dedicated gender Subcommittee was established at the talks, mandated to ensure that a gender perspective and women's rights are included in all agreements.(90)

The gender Subcommittee of the peace talking is unique in the world. In mid-2014, when the discussion of the agreement for Victims was initiated, negotiators announced the creation of the Sub commission of gender with the mission of ensuring a gender approach in partial agreements that had been reached at the moment and in the future settlements.

(Redaguoti)

Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon Addresses the Crowd at the Colombian peace ceremony in Cartagena where Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader Timoleón Jiménez signed a peace accord on September 26, 2016

The Colombian peace process distinguishes itself from other conflicts because of the level of support and involvement of the international community. The role of international community in the peace process was that of a facilitator and guarantor for the peace talks.(91) On January 25, 2016, the Security Council of the United Nations supported the ongoing peace talks in Havana by unanimously adopting resolution A/RES/2261 including the decision to accompany the end of the conflict in Colombia – one of only 14 decisions the Security Council adopted unanimously in its history.(92) After implicit invitation of the conflict parties in section 6.3 of the final agreement, the United Nations currently monitor the conflict parties' compliance with the final agreement in accordance with resolution A/RES/2435.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) served as independent intermediary during the peace talks and provided logistical support. Apart from transporting FARC negotiators to the peace talks in Havana, the ICRC was also involved in several hostage rescues and conducted rescue operations of FARC fighters and Colombian military personnel.(93)

The peace process and the Havana peace talks were supported by the governments of Norway and Cuba that are both guarantors of the final agreement. The involvement of Norway and Cuba contributed to the mutual trust of the conflict parties and to the credibility of the peace process. While the involvement of third parties in the drafting of peace agreements does not alter the legal status of the peace agreement, it contributed to the successful conclusion of the negotiation: The lacking involvement of the international community in the peace negotiations during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana is said to have contributed to the failure of the negotiations.(94)

Norway also contributed to the peace process by sending an investigation team to determine and establish the zones contaminated by anti-personnel mines and other explosives of the civil war.(92) Norway and Cuba both made the peace negotiations possible by providing a meeting venue: The peace talks were formally inaugurated in Oslo, Norway, on October 18, 2012, and then moved to their permanent location in Havana, Cuba.(27)

The governments of Chile and Venezuela served as observer state during the peace talks. The peace process also received the support of a number of other governments in Latin-America such as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa the President of Ecuador, and Bolivian President Evo Morales.(4)

The Security Council of the United Nations underlined the important role that third countries played during the Colombian peace process in resolution A/RES/2261. According to Juan Manuel Santos, the peace process would not have been successful without the support of the international community.(95)

Contents of the agreements(Redaguoti)

Comprehensive rural development (May 26, 2013)(Redaguoti)

Extremely unequal land ownership is both a cause and a consequence of the Colombian armed conflict. In 1960, 0.4% of landowners held 30% of all farmland. By 1997, the concentration of land ownership was further accentuated, with 0.35% of landowners holding 45% of all farmland with 86% owning just 13%.(96):66 In 2012, 1% of landowners (those owning large properties over 200 hectares) held 43% of the land, and an additional 13% of landowners (those owning medium-sized properties over 20 hectares) held 39% of the land. 79% of landowners had properties of less than 10 hectares (considered microfundio et minifundio), which accounted for just 11% of private rural land.(97) The 2014 Agricultural Census reported that 0.4% of agricultural production units (over 500 hectares) occupy 77.6% of the country's rural area, while 71% of agricultural production units (less than 5 hectares) occupy just 2% of rural land area.(98) On the largest landholdings (over 1,000 hectares), an average of only 28% of the land is used for agricultural purposes with the remainder of the land covered by natural vegetation, confirming common accusations that the land is underutilized.(98) The 2014 census also showed that, since 1960, the fragmentation of smallholdings had increased – production units of less than 5 hectares increased from 63% of 71% of the total number of such units – while the weight of large landholdings (over 500 hectares) in the total rural land area had increased significantly from 40% to 77.6%.(98) The inequitable land distribution has increased since 2000, as measured by the Gini coefficient for land ownership – 0.885 in 2009, compared to 0.877 in 2000.(96):125 Colombia is one of the countries with the highest inequality in rural property in Latin America and the world.(un devis est requis)

Poverty in rural Colombia is significantly higher than in the cities. In 2014, Colombia's multidimensional poverty rate was about 21%, but in rural areas poverty was 45%.(99)

The expansion and escalation of the armed conflict since the 1980s has greatly contributed to the consolidation of inequality in land distribution, through the illegal dispossession of land, forced displacement and re-concentration of ownership. The scale of land dispossession is disputed, but is estimated that as high as 6.6 million hectares were illegally seized (by drug traffickers, paramilitaries, agribusiness, the government or the guerrilla) over the last two decades.(100)

Agrarian reform has been one of the FARC's main causes since the guerrilla's foundation in 1964. However, since then, the FARC's demands on agrarian reform have evolved significantly. In 1964, the nascent guerrilla called for the confiscation of Latifundia to deliver them for free to farmers. In 1982, at their seventh conference, the FARC issued a 'law' for agrarian reform abolishing land owned by foreign, oil, mining, banana or timber companies and latifundio properties over 1,500 hectares, to be turned over to the FARC for distribution to farmers. During the Caguán peace process, the FARC demanded the recovery of unproductive land for agrarian reform.(101) The FARC arrived in Havana with moderated views on the subject – their proposals included stimulation of agricultural use of land for food production to achieve food sovereignty, empowering rural communities and formalization of property titles.

Comprehensive or integral rural reform and development was the first item on the general agreement between the government and the FARC, and a partial agreement was signed in May 2013. The agreement has four cornerstones: access to land and land use, the establishment of special development programs, poverty reduction and eradication of extreme poverty, and food security. The main measures laid out include:(102)(103)

  • Un Land Fund would be created, to provide 'comprehensive access' to land for landless or land-poor peasants. The lands would be acquired through judicial expiration of ownership, recovery of illegally acquired land, expropriation for the social interest or public utility or unexploited lands. The land would be accompanied by a comprehensive subsidy, credits, technical assistance, housing, marketing and access to means of production provided by the government. Redistributed land would be inalienable and non-transferable for a period of seven years.
  • A 'massive' formalization of property titles for small and medium rural properties. It is estimated that a fifth of all rural properties, and nearly half of small ones, have title problems, a problem which prevents the existence of a real market for land and investments and which has facilitated land dispossession during the conflict.(104)
  • The creation of an agricultural jurisdiction to ensure effective legal protection for rural inhabitants' property rights.
  • Update and modernization of the rural cadastre and rural property tax. Creation of a new high-level body formulating general guidelines for land use and implementing reconversion programs. The agreement would strengthen citizen participation in land use planning, with mechanisms for consultation with all levels of government and ethnic minorities.
  • The government would delimit the agricultural frontier and protect areas of special environmental interest.
  • The establishment of special development programs with a territorial approach (PDET) to achieve structural transformation of rural Colombia, in priority those regions which have been most affected by the conflict and poverty. The action plans would be developed in a participatory manner aimed at fostering regional transformation.
  • Implementation of national plans for comprehensive rural reform, aimed at reducing poverty by 50% and eradicating extreme poverty within a transitional phase of 10 years. These plans would include infrastructure (roads, irrigation, electricity, internet connectivity), social development (health, education, housing, drinking water), incentives for the productivity of family agriculture (technical assistance, cooperative economy, special lines of credit, subsidized crop insurance, marketing) and rural labour formalization.
  • Un Food security system which would include food and nutritional councils at all territorial levels, programs against hunger and malnutrition, measures to strengthen local and regional markets and promotion of proper food handling practices for families.

Political participation (November 6, 2013)(Redaguoti)

The transformation from a guerrilla movement to a political party has been one of the FARC's main public aims since the beginning of negotiations. At the same time, their potential political participation is one of the most unpopular points of the peace process.

The FARC considers Colombia to have a non-democratic political system marked by state terrorism, and has demanded a 'democratic opening' which includes not only institutional reforms but broader popular participation for social movements and greater direct democracy. The government considers the 1991 Constitution to have created a more democratic political system, with different possibilities for popular participation in politics.

A partial agreement on political participation, the second point of the agenda, was announced on November 6, 2013. This agreement seeks to strengthen the participation of all Colombians in politics and public affairs and the expansion of democracy as a way to resolve conflicts peacefully and finally break the link between politics and armed confrontation. The three main points of this agreement are greater citizen participation, a democratic opening and breaking the link between politics and weapons. The main measures are:(103)(105)

  • Creation of a statute of the opposition following the signature of the final agreement, following discussions in a commission made of legally recognized political parties and movements. No legislation defining guarantees for opposition parties has ever been adopted, despite being required by article 112 of the 1991 Constitution.
  • Security guarantees for political activities, through the creation of a Comprehensive Security System. These security guarantees would be aimed at protecting those who participate in politics by respecting their human rights and dignity, preventing violence and instilling a culture of tolerance and coexistence to prevent stigmatization and persecution of political leaders. The security guarantees, including the structure of the Comprehensive Security System, were fleshed out on June 23, 2016. The Comprehensive Security System, led by a high-level body and a technical committee, would implement a protection program to protect members of the new party or movement founded by the FARC. For such purposes, a dedicated sub-unit of the National Protection Unit (which would include demobilized members of the FARC) and a security and protection body (with members of the FARC's political movement in liaison with the National Police), would be created. A National Commission of Security Guarantees, chaired by the President, would design and monitor public and criminal policies aimed at the dismantlement of any organization contravening the agreement. The security guarantees would also extend to social movements, human rights defenders, Security and protection guarantees are particularly important for the FARC, whose greatest fear is a repeat of the extermination of the Patriotic Union (UP) in the 1980s, when over one thousand members of the left-wing political party (founded in 1985 with the FARC's participation following the La Uribe ceasefire agreement in 1984) were assassinated by paramilitaries and agents of the state.(106)
  • Creation of 16 Special Temporary Peace Constituencies for the election of representatives to the Chamber of Representatives for two terms (2018-2022, 2022-2026). These districts would be created in the regions most affected by the conflict, which are also the regions where the FARC are strongest. The inhabitants of these regions would be able to elect, during the transitional phase and on a temporary basis, additional members to the lower house with special rules. Candidates must be regular residents of the districts or displaced from them in the process of returning, and may be registered by social movements or community organizations. This is separate from the provision granting FARC 10 seats (5 in each house).(107) In the revised agreement, FARC is prohibited from running in these zones. A member of the National Electoral Council is expected to table a constitutional amendment to create these constituencies. According to this bill, there would be thirteen single-member constituencies (in addition to regular seats) for three terms, or twelve years, with candidates elected representing social organizations and not political parties with congressional representation. The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation also proposed the creation of nine Ex officio seats for the FARC in the Senate. The proposal has generated significant public debate.(108)(109)
  • Facilitate the creation of new political parties and detach the attainment and conservation of parties' legal status from the requirement to surpass the threshold in congressional elections. During a transitional period of eight years, the state would give special support to the creation of new parties through funding and outreach programs. Adopt measures to promote equality of conditions during electoral campaigns.
  • Promotion of electoral participation through national registration, education, information and outreach campaigns.
  • Increase the transparency of the electoral process and transparency in the allocation of government advertising, by creating a national court for electoral guarantees, strengthening the investigation of electoral crimes and ensuring greater transparency in campaign financing.
  • Electoral reform, including reform of the electoral bodies, to be discussed by a special electoral mission.
  • Promotion of a democratic and participatory political culture based on respect for democratic values and principles, transparent management of public management (banning patronage and corruption) and integration of marginalized communities (women, LGBT, Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples).
  • Creation of new media spaces for political parties and movements, with a new institutional television channel for parties to publicize their platforms, and to publicize the work of organizations and social movements.
  • Un guarantees law for social organizations and movements which will, among other things, guarantee their access to information, right to reply and correction and participation in decision making.
  • Guarantees for social protests, including both protesters and other citizens.
  • Increased civic participation in institutional, regional and local media in order to inform about the activities of different civil society organizations.
  • Measures to promote a culture of tolerance, non-stigmatization and reconciliation, to be overseen by a National Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence.
  • Citizen oversight and control to ensure the transparency of public management and proper use of resources.
  • Promote the participation and influence of citizens in territorial planning and budgeting, with the creation of Territorial Planning Councils which would draw from various organizations and movements.

In July 2016, the negotiating parties announced through a joint communiqué the composition of the commissions which would study the opposition statute, electoral reform and the guarantees law for social organizations and movements.(110)

The final agreement announced on August 24 establishes guarantees for the new political party or movement to be created by the demobilized FARC following the end of the decommissioning process. The representatives of the FARC would formally register their new political movement before the National Electoral Council, providing their act of creation, party statutes, code of ethics, ideological platform and appointment of its leadership. As a result of this formal registration, the new party would be recognized as a legally constituted and recognized party under Colombian law, and it would have to comply with all the legal requirements to remain a legally registered party except for membership requirements and, until 2026, the electoral threshold (3% of votes nationally) required for other parties to maintain their legal status. To facilitate the FARC's transformation into a political party, it would receive, until 2026, public financial assistance equivalent to 10% of the annual budget for political parties and, until 2022, an additional 5% of said budget. The presidential and senatorial candidates of the new party would receive public funding for the 2018 and 2022 elections.

In addition, following the conclusion of the decommissioning process, the government would amend the constitution and laws as necessary to allow for the temporary, ex officio participation of the FARC's new party in the Congress for two terms beginning in July 2018. Although the party's lists, either alone or in coalition, would compete equally for seats in both houses, the new party would be guaranteed five seats in each house, including those won according to regular electoral rules. Until 2018, the FARC would be represented in each house of Congress by three speakers who would only be allowed to participate in the debates for the constitutional and legal reforms which would follow the adoption of the final agreement. The FARC's new party would also be entitled to transitory representation in the National Electoral Council.(111)

Illicit drugs (May 16, 2014)(Redaguoti)

Drug cultivation, production and trafficking has been inextricably linked to the Colombian armed conflict for decades, having served as the main source of financing for most illegal armed groups (including the FARC) while playing a central role in the Colombian and foreign governments' responses to the internal conflict.

Colombia continues to be the world's single largest producer of cocaine and coca leaves. The land area under coca cultivation has decreased from over 140,000 hectares in 2001 due to aerial coca eradication and manual eradication, but there has been an increase in coca cultivation since 2013, with 96,000 hectares under coca cultivation in 2015 according to the latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, representing a 39% increase on the previous year. The majority (81%) of coca cultivation is concentrated in three southern departments (Nariño, Cauca, Putumayo, Caquetá) and in Norte de Santander Department, which are also regions with a substantial FARC presence. The UNODC suggests that different negotiations on the issue, in Havana and other settings, are generating incentives for increased coca cultivation because of the perception that the benefits of development projects would mainly be directed at coca cultivators.(112)

The FARC are involved in all stages of production, from coca cultivation to wholesale drug trade. In the 1990s, the FARC successfully co-opted some cocalero (coca cultivators) movements, and was originally primarily involved in the production stage while paramilitary groups dominated the more lucrative drug trafficking. However, by the second half of the 1990s, the dismantling of the Medellín and Cali cartels and the dissolution of the Soviet Union triggered the entrance of the FARC into the drug trafficking business.(113):3 A recent investigation by the Colombian attorney general's office concluded that FARC units are involved both directly and indirectly in the cultivation, processing and distribution – directly as owners of crops, laboratories, crystallization workshops as well as the distribution corridors contacting clients including national and international drug cartels; indirectly by providing security to crops or labs, organizing peasants in anti-eradication marches, setting product prices, charging taxes on the product or by providing security to third-party drug traffickers in return for a fee. The study also estimated at over US$22,900,000 (66,277,978,247 pesos) the guerrilla's revenues from narcotics and related taxes between 1995 and 2014.(114)

The FARC adamantly reject that they are drug traffickers, but have admitted to financing their activities through taxes levied at different stages of the drug production process (on producers, buyers, laboratory production and landing strips). The Colombian and American governments have considered the FARC to be one of the world's leading drug trafficking organizations. Although "Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States" according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, "the FARC-EP are increasingly working with Mexican TCOs to smuggle ton quantities of cocaine into the United States." The report indicates ties between the FARC and Mexican drug cartels including Los Zetas, Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel.(115) In Havana, the FARC claimed that "the traditional drug policy of the Colombian state has been focused on the persecution of the weakest elements of the drug-trafficking chain: cultivators and consumers."(116)

In 1999, in response to the large increase in domestic cocaine production activities and the deterioration of security conditions, the Colombian and US governments announced Plan Colombia, a joint anti-drug strategy. The main aims of the Plan were a 50% reduction in the production and trafficking of illegal drugs within six years and an improvement of security conditions in Colombia. US funding for the military component of Plan Colombia was on average US$540 million per year between 2000 and 2008, while the Colombian government invested approximately US$812 million per year.(113):3–4 Following the September 11 attacks, Plan Colombia resources began to be used for anti-guerrilla operations. Over 80% of US aid to Colombia between 2000 and 2007 was military assistance, which came to reinforce the modernization of the Colombian armed forces under the Pastrana and Uribe administrations.(4):167–169

Since the start of Plan Colombia, the main strategy for reducing cocaine production has been the aerial spraying of coca plantations with herbicides such as glyphosate. Since 2000 more than 1,600,000 hectares of coca crops have been sprayed and more than 413,000 have been manually eradicated.(113):5 Aerial spraying of illicit crops is both very expensive and ineffective – for each hectare sprayed with glyphosate, coca crops are reduced by about 0.02 to 0.065 hectares, so 32 hectares of coca need to be sprayed to eradicate just one hectare (an effectiveness rate of just 4.2%). The marginal cost of removing one kilogram of cocaine from the market through spraying is roughly $240,000. Aerial spraying has a negative impact on the environment (deforestation, water pollution, harm to ecosystems), health (skin problems, respiratory illnesses, miscarriages) and causes internal displacement.(113):9ème After 2006, Colombian anti-drug policies shifted towards interdiction strategies (cocaine seizures, lab destruction, dismantling cartels) which have been far more effective than eradication strategies. These policies caused a major supply shock (increasing the street price of cocaine in the US), greatly reduced the net cocaine supply and led to major changes in the drug trafficking operations (shifting towards Central America and Mexico).(113):11ème Juan Manuel Santos, who had been responsible for the post-2006 drug strategy as defence minister, continued these policies as president. The Colombian government now addresses drug consumption from a public health angle and advocates for alternative development strategies in vulnerable regions affected by coca cultivation, while adopting a "rational and efficient" strategy against criminal activities tied to drug trafficking. As part of this new policy, in October 2015 the government ordered the suspension of aerial aspersion with glyphosate.(112):68, 80

The partial agreement between the FARC and the government on illicit drugs, announced in May 2014, reflects this paradigmatic shift away from the traditional militaristic approach and towards the voluntary substitution of illicit crops and social transformations in affected territories. The main measures announced are:(103)(116)(117)

  • Substitution of illicit crops, through a joint process of participatory planning with the affected communities to ensure their active and effective participation in the decision-making process and in the joint construction of solutions. The program would be a component of comprehensive rural development, within a framework of territorial integration and social inclusion with a differential approach taking into account the realities of different regions. The objectives would be promotion of the voluntary substitution of crops, poverty reduction, productive opportunities for the cultivators, sustainable development, strengthened communities and strengthening the presence of the State. In cases where no agreement with the community is reached, the State would proceed with the eradication of illicit crops, prioritizing manual eradication wherever possible.
  • Participatory planning processes to find solutions to illicit crops and poverty, in order to establish a new alliance between the communities and the three levels of government to solve communities' problems.
  • Immediate assistance plans for illicit crops growers would be put in place. These would include immediate food assistance, projects of quick income generation, options of seasonal employment for migrant collectors, education, early childhood assistance, generation of employment options, infrastructure projects,
  • An evidence-based public health and human rights policy approach to the problem of drug use, based on the view that drug use is a phenomenon of a multi-causal nature. State institutions, in coordination with communities and families, would establish a national attention system including rehabilitation and social insertion measures.
  • Comprehensive strategy to dismantle and prosecute drug trafficking organizations.
  • Strengthen the fight against money laundering in all economic sectors.
  • Establish strict controls on the production and trafficking of chemical inputs for drug production.
  • Promotion of an international conference within the framework of the United Nations to objectively evaluate the war on drugs and seek to build a new consensus around the adjustments deemed necessary, taking into account the discussions and new international developments on the matter.

In announcing the partial agreement on illicit drugs, the FARC committed to "contribute in an effective manner, with utmost determination and in different forms and through practical actions towards the final solution to the problem of illicit drugs, and to end any relationship that, based on their rebellion, may have taken place with this phenomenon."(103)(116) Furthermore, the joint communiqué stated the construction of lasting peace requires everybody's "willingness to contribute to the elucidation of the relationship between conflict and the growing, production and marketing of illicit drugs and money laundering that result from this phenomenon."(116)

Victims (December 15, 2015)(Redaguoti)

The fifth point on the general agreement for negotiations was victims, a vast and complex item which included important issues such as transitional justice, reparations, truth and victims' rights.

The item was one of the most complicated for the two parties to find an agreement on. The FARC, which claimed that its insurgency was justified and that it was not militarily defeated, initially refused to submit to the laws and institutions of a political system which it opposed. On the other hand, the government had the obligation to design a transitional justice system which would be satisfactory to the FARC (who sought restorative justice) but also in keeping with Colombia's international treaty obligations, notably the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Complicating issues further, both the FARC and the government have historically refused to admit responsibility for crimes they have committed, with the guerrilla considering itself a victim of State oppression and the Colombian government considering itself to be the leader and defender of a democratic society.(118)

In June 2014, the two delegations in Havana announced a set of ten principles which would guide their discussions on the victims issue. These principles were: recognition of victims, recognition of responsibility, satisfaction of victims' rights, victims' participation, elucidation of the truth, reparations for victims, guarantees of protection and security, guarantees of non-repetition, reconciliation and a rights-based approach.(103)

The various components of the full agreement on victims were gradually announced to the general public throughout 2015, with the cornerstone agreement on the "special jurisdiction for peace" being announced on September 23, 2015. On December 15, 2015, a full partial agreement on victims was announced. Taken as a whole, the agreement creates a Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition (Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición). The system would seek to satisfy the rights of all victims of the armed conflict, including victims of the guerrillas, the State and paramilitarism. Access to judicial benefits under the Comprehensive System would be conditioned to contributing to the elucidation of the truth and reparations.(119)

The Comprehensive System is made up of five components: Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-repetition; Special unit for the search of missing persons in the context of and due to the armed conflict; Special Jurisdiction for Peace; Comprehensive reparation measures for peace-building and guarantees of non-repetition.

Truth commission(Redaguoti)

A truth commission entitled the "Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-repetition" (Comisión para el esclarecimiento de la verdad, la convivencia y la no repetición) would be created following the signature of the final agreement. Its aim is to contribute to the construction and preservation of historical memory, reach an understanding of the conflict's multiple dimensions, satisfy victims' rights and promote coexistence. The Commission would be centered on victims (their dignification and satisfaction of their right to the truth) and its work impartial, independent, transitory and extrajudicial. It would require broad participation, working at a national level but with a territorial approach (with the aim of achieving a better understanding of the regional dynamics of the conflict) and differential and gender-based approach (it would consider the different experiences, impact and conditions of persons because of their sex, gender, age, ethnicity or disabilities).(120)(121)

As an extrajudicial mechanism, the truth commission's activities would be non-judicial in nature and would not imply criminal responsibility for those testifying before it, nor can these testimonies be transferred to judicial authorities although the commission may request information from judges and investigative bodies as required for its work.(121)

The Commission would have as a mandate to clarify practices which constitute serious human rights, collective responsibilities for these practices, the social and human impact of the conflict on society and different groups, the impact of the conflict on politics and democracy, the historical context of the conflict with its multiple causes and the factors and conditions which contributed to the persistence of the conflict. To do so, the Commission would investigate all the aforementioned elements, hold public hearings, present a final report, diffuse its work, ensure the gender mainstreaming throughout its work and be periodically accountable.(120) The government and the FARC have committed to contribute to the clarification of the truth and to recognize their respective responsibilities before the Commission.(121)

The Commission would be composed of 11 members, chosen by the selection mechanism for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (see below). The Commission would work for three years, following a six months preparation period.(111)

Search unit for missing persons(Redaguoti)

The Special Unit for the Search of Missing Persons in the context and due to the armed conflict (Unidad especial para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas en el contexto y en razón del conflicto armado) would be a special high-level unit created following the signature of the final agreement. It would direct and coordinate efforts to search for and locate missing persons, or find their remains so that they may be returned to their families. To carry out its work, the search unit would collect the necessary information about missing persons, analyze the information collected, strengthen and streamline processes for identifying mortal remains in coordination with the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, guarantee families' participation and present an official report to families informing them of the fate of missing relatives.(121)

The search unit would be administrative and financially independent and autonomous, complementing the other components of the Comprehensive System.

Special Jurisdiction for Peace(Redaguoti)

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) would be the transitional justice component of the Comprehensive System, complying with Colombia's duty to investigate, clarify, prosecute and punish serious human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law which occurred during the armed conflict. Its objectives would be to satisfy victims' right to justice, offer truth to the public, contribute to the reparation of victims, contribute to the fight against impunity, adopt decisions which give full legal security to direct and indirect participants in the conflict and contribute to the achievement of a stable and lasting peace.(122)

The JEP's guiding principles would be the centrality of victims; legal security (the JEP's decisions would be res judicata and immutable); conditionality; the right to peace; comprehensiveness as a component of the broader Comprehensive System; indivisibility (the JEP would apply to all who participated directly or indirectly in the conflict); prevalence over other criminal, disciplinary or administrative proceedings for acts committed in the armed conflict; guarantees of due process; differential focus taking into account the different consequences of crimes against women and against the most vulnerable groups; gender equality and concentration on the most serious and representative cases.(122)

Following the end of the armed conflict, the government would "grant the broadest possible amnesty" (as per section 5, article 6 of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions) for rebels who have subscribed a final peace agreement with the State (crime of rebellion) and for those accused or condemned for political and related offences, as permitted by the Colombian Constitution. Amnesty or pardon does not absolve one from the obligation to contribute, individually or collectively, to the clarification of the truth. An amnesty law adopted by Congress would clearly determine those crimes eligible for amnesty or pardon and those which are not, as well as the definition of related offences. Political offences include rebellion, sedition, military uprising, illegal possession of weapons, death in combat compatible with international law, agreement to commit an offence for the purpose of rebellion and other related offences. Related offences would be defined by an inclusive and restrictive criteria; the first including offences specifically related to the development of the rebellion during the conflict, offences in which the passive subject is the State and any actions aimed at facilitating, supporting, financing or hiding the development of rebellion.(122) In all circumstances, crimes against humanity, genocide, serious war crimes, hostage taking or other severe deprivations of physical liberty, torture, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearance, violent sexual intercourse and other kinds of sexual violence, child abduction, forced displacement and the recruitment of minors would not be eligible for amnesty or pardon.(121)

The Colombian Supreme Court has ruled that drug trafficking is a related offence to rebellion, as long as this activity was conducted to finance the insurgency.(123) The inclusion of drug trafficking has generated significant controversy in Colombia. The government, pro-government legislators, the Ombudsman and the then-attorney general supported the inclusion of drug trafficking as a related offence, arguing that it was used to finance the rebellion. Senator Álvaro Uribe and inspector general Alejandro Ordóñez have strongly opposed its inclusion as a related offence, with Uribe stating that drug trafficking was tied to terrorism rather than political ends.(124)

The final agreement, in its annexes, includes the text of the amnesty law which would be presented to Congress. There would be three types of offences: ones directly eligible for amnesty (those most closely related to membership in the guerrilla), ones which would never be eligible for amnesty and others which would be defined the amnesty chamber of the JEP (including drug trafficking and kidnapping).(111)(125)

Crimes which are not eligible for amnesty or pardon would be submitted to the JEP, which would have jurisdiction over all who participated directly or indirectly in the armed conflict: combatants of illegal armed groups who have subscribed a final peace agreement with the State, agents of the State who committed crimes in the conflict and third parties who directly or indirectly participated in the conflict without being members of an armed groups. The JEP would have jurisdiction over non-coercive financing of or collaboration with paramilitary groups for persons who had a 'determinant participation in the most serious and representative crimes'. However, members of paramilitary groups who demobilized and appeared before an ordinary court or the justice and peace tribunals would not be the competence of the JEP, although the government would commit to adopt measures to strengthen the clarification of the paramilitary phenomenon.(122) Colombian Presidents, who benefit from a special constitutional status (article 174), would not be subject to the JEP. In the JEP, there would be "a special, simultaneous, balanced and equitable treatment" for agents of the State, founded on international humanitarian law and the military's operational rules.(121)

It was agreed in the final agreement that the legal sentences of all FARC combatants convicted of offences within the JEP's jurisdiction would be suspended until the JEP has been formed and has handled the individual's respective case.

Two procedures would be applied, the first procedure in the case of acknowledgment of truth and acknowledgment of responsibility and the second procedure in the absence of acknowledgment of truth and responsibility.(122) Responsibility would be publicly acknowledged collectively or individually in the year following the creation of the JEP; in the case of a collective acknowledgement of responsibility, individuals named may express their disagreement, in which case they would be subject to the second procedure.(121)

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace would be composed of the following five bodies and an executive secretariat:(121)(122)(126)

  1. Chamber of Acknowledgment of Truth, Responsibility and establishment of facts and conducts (Sala de Reconocimiento de Verdad y Responsabilidad y de Determinación de los Hechos y Conductas): The chamber would be the organizer of all the cases received by the jurisdiction, filtering cases to concentrate on the most serious and representative crimes not eligible for amnesty. It would receive reports from the Attorney General, Inspector General, Comptroller General, the military criminal justice system, victims' organizations, human rights organizations as well as any relevant legal investigations and judgments. Having determined whether the cases received fall under the JEP's jurisdiction, it would group the reports by alleged/convicted perpetrator and similar conducts and present reports on practices or events, identifying all responsible and their shares of responsibility. On the basis of these reports, those individuals identified would acknowledge or deny their responsibility, individually or collectively. The Chamber would present a resolution of conclusions to the Peace Tribunal, with emphasis on the most serious and representative crimes, individualization of responsibilities, acknowledgements of responsibility and the identification of the appropriate sanctions. In cases without acknowledgement of responsibility, the Chamber would transmit the cases to the Investigation and Prosecution Unit for it to begin proceedings as appropriate. The Chamber would have considerable autonomy to manage its own affairs, set its rules, form working commissions, establish priorities, adopt criteria for selection and decongestion or define the sequence in which cases would be addressed.
  2. Amnesty and Pardon Chamber (Sala de Amnistía e Indulto): On the basis of the amnesty law the chamber would grant amnesty to persons sentenced or investigated for offences eligible for amnesty or pardon, and decide on the admissibility of amnesties recommended by the Chamber of Acknowledgment. In the event that the request or recommendation for pardon or amnesty is ineligible, the amnesty chamber would remit the case to the Chamber of Acknowledgment.
  3. Chamber for the Definition of legal situations (Sala de Definición de Situaciones Jurídicas): The definition chamber would be responsible for defining the legal situation of those who are ineligible for amnesty but not included in the Chamber of Acknowledgment's resolution of conclusions. In defining these persons' legal situations, it would have the power to decide whether to continue legal proceedings. It would also have the responsibility of determining possible procedural mechanisms to select and prioritize the cases of those who have not acknowledged responsibility.
  4. Investigation and Prosecution Unit (Unidad de Investigación y Acusación): The investigation and indictment unit would handle the cases in which responsibility has not been acknowledged. It would investigate and, when necessary, lay charges before the Peace Tribunal or refer the cases to the defining chamber or amnesty chamber. In the course of its investigations, it may decide on protective measures for victims and witnesses. The unit would include a forensics research team and a special investigation unit for cases of sexual violence.
  5. Peace Tribunal (Tribunal para la Paz), itself further subdivided into five sections: first instance in cases of acknowledgment of responsibility, first instance in cases of absence of acknowledgment of responsibility, appeals section, revision section and stability and effectiveness section.
    1. First instance in cases of acknowledgment of responsibility: In cases where responsibility is acknowledged, this section of the tribunal would evaluate the correspondence between the acknowledged acts (and those responsible for them) with the sanctions proposed by the Chamber of Acknowledgment's resolution of conclusions. It would then impose the appropriate sanctions, establish the conditions and modalities for implementing them and supervise compliance with the sentence in cooperation with the monitoring and verification bodies and mechanisms.
    2. First instance in cases of absence of acknowledgment of responsibility: The section would take cognizance of the charges laid by the Investigation and Prosecution Unit, proceed with an adversarial trial for those cases where responsibility has not been acknowledged and, when appropriate, render judgment and imposing alternative or ordinary sanctions when necessary.
    3. Revision section: The revision section would revise the cases of those already convicted by the ordinary courts and decide on the appropriate sanctions. It would also revise, at the request of the convicted person, the judgments of the ordinary courts dealing with conducts which occurred during the armed conflict when absence of fact or manifest error in the legal judgment is alleged. In addition, the revision section would resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the organs of the JEP and decide on requests for a person's attendance before the JEP.
    4. Appeals section: The appeals section would hear appeals against the judgments of the chambers and sections of the JEP, and victims' appeals against the sections' judgments for infringement of fundamental rights. The rulings rendered by the JEP would be res judicata and immutable.
    5. Stability and effectiveness section: After the Peace Tribunal has fulfilled its duties, this section would be established to ensure the stability and effectiveness of the resolutions and sanctions adopted by the JEP and resolve the cases which emerge following the end of the Tribunal's duties for acts committed before the signature of the final agreement and falling under the JEP's jurisdiction.

The Peace Tribunal would be made up of a total of 20 Colombian and four foreign magistrates, who would be highly qualified experts in various areas of law particularly international humanitarian law, human rights law and conflict resolution. Colombian members of the tribunal would need to meet the same requirements as members of the country's three highest courts; namely to be native-born citizens, lawyers, never convicted of any crime besides political offences and a professional or academic career of fifteen years in the field of law. The three chambers would have a total of 18 Colombian and 6 foreign magistrates. The investigation and prosecution unit would be made up of at least 16 highly qualified legal professionals, 12 of which would be Colombian nationals.(111)(121)

The selection mechanism was announced on August 12, 2016. It is to be made up of representatives appointed by Pope Francis, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the criminal chamber of Colombia's Supreme Court of Justice, the delegation of the International Center for Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Permanent Commission of the State University System. Members of the selection committee would elect magistrates with a four-fifths majority using a voting system promoting consensus. In addition to the magistrates of the chambers and tribunal, it would also select a list of 12 Colombian and 4 foreign alternates for the tribunal and chambers, the president of the JEP and the president of the Investigation and Prosecution Unit.(111)

Sanctions and punishments(Redaguoti)

The agreement guarantees that extradition would not be granted for offences and crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the JEP and committed during the armed conflict prior to the signature of the final agreement. In addition, the imposition of any punishment by the JEP would not limit any right to political participation.(122)

The goal of the punishments imposed would be the satisfaction of victims' rights and the consolidation of peace, and would always be related to the level of acknowledgment of truth and responsibility in collective or individual declarations to the JEP, the gravity of the punished act, the level of participation and responsibility and the accused's commitment to truth and reparation of the victims. The punishment in cases where there has been acknowledgment of responsibility before the Chamber of Acknowledgment would be lesser than in cases of late or no acknowledgment.

There would be three types of sanctions or punishments: ordinary sanctions of the JEP, alternative sanctions and ordinary sanctions, depending the level and time of acknowledgment of truth and responsibility.

Ordinary sanctions of the JEP would be imposed to those who acknowledge responsibility in serious offences before the Chamber of Acknowledgment and would have a minimum duration of five years and maximum duration of eight years. The sanctions would have a restorative and reparative aim and involve 'effective restrictions of freedom and rights', including restrictions to the freedom of residence and movement which would be monitored and supervised to ensure compliance with the tribunal's orders. These sanctions would in no case involve imprisonment. For those who have did not have a 'decisive participation' in the commission of the serious acts, the punishment would be between two and five years.

The restorative sanctions would be involve participation in projects, carried out in rural and urban areas, including: construction of infrastructure, environmental conservation, effective reparation for displaced peasants, substitution of illicit crops, rural and urban development, rural electrification, mine clearance and so forth.(121)

Alternative sanctions would be imposed to those who acknowledge responsibility later, before the first instance of the tribunal. They would serve an essentially retributive function and involve a deprivation of freedom – including prison – of five to eight years (two to five years for those who did not have a 'decisive participation').

Ordinary sentences would be imposed to those found guilty by the tribunal when there has been no acknowledgment of responsibility, and would be served according to provisions of regular criminal law for prison terms no lesser than 15 years and no greater than 20 years.

The places where the sentences would be served would be subject to monitoring of a national and international verification body of the Comprehensive System, as well as security and protection measures(121)(122)

Reparations(Redaguoti)

Seven measures for comprehensive reparations are laid out in the agreement on victims, with the aim of contributing to the construction of peace and the recognition of victims and the damages of war. Victims are to be at the heart of all reparation measures.(121)

  1. Timely measures for the acknowledgment of collective responsibilities: All responsible parties undertake to participate in formal, public and solemn acts at the national and territorial levels recognizing their collective responsibility for damages caused, to ask for forgiveness and manifest their commitment to contribute to concrete measures of reparation.
  2. Concrete measures to contribute to reparation: All those who have caused harm in the context of the conflict would be able to participate in concrete restorative actions, which would be taken into account to receive special legal benefits under the JEP. For the FARC, these measures would include reconstruction of infrastructure, mine clearance and decontamination, participation in illicit crop substitution programs, participation in the search for missing persons and environmental conservation projects (e.g., reforestation). The government would promote the participation in such projects of agents of the State and others who participated (directly or indirectly) in the conflict.
  3. Collective reparations at the end of the conflict: Collective reparation processes would include the special development programs with a territorial approach (PDET) in regions most affected by the conflict, territorial collective reparation plans in regions where a PDET would not be implemented, and national collective reparation plans for groups and organizations (women's groups, economic associations, political parties and movements).
  4. Psycho-social rehabilitation: Measures for individual emotional recovery and psycho-social rehabilitation plans for coexistence and non-repetition (community rehabilitation strategies for the reconstruction of the social fabric).(121)
  5. Collective right to return processes for displaced persons and reparations for victims abroad: For the right of return to displaced persons, the processes would be new collective programs to return and relocate victims of internal displacement, in coordination with other measures. For victims living outside of the national territory (refugees and exiles), the government would implement programs to assist and accompany their return to Colombia.
  6. Land restitution measures: Existing land restitution processes would be strengthened to guarantee their coordination with collective reparation processes, territorial development programs and others plans and programs resulting from the final agreement.
  7. Implementation and participative strengthening of victims' reparations policies: Existing forums for victims' participation would be expanded and strengthened to include victims and their organizations not currently part of these forums and ensure their participation therein. The final agreement does not resolve questions about material reparations by the FARC.

Non-repetition(Redaguoti)

The guarantees of non-repetition would be the result of the implementation of the different mechanisms and measures of the Comprehensive System, measures agreed upon under the 'end of the conflict' item and all other points of the final agreement (rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs). These guarantees are part of a broader, overarching shared commitment to respect human rights, promote the rights of all Colombians, coexistence, tolerance and free political participation.

As part of guarantees of non-repetition, the government would implement measures to strengthen human rights promotion mechanisms and the protection mechanisms for human rights organizations and advocates. Specifically, this would include the promotion of a culture of human rights for peace and reconciliation, the strengthening of national information and monitoring systems for human rights, the implementation of human rights education, the strengthening of human rights organizations, the elaboration of a comprehensive protection protocol for human rights organizations, strengthened collaboration with the attorney general's office to follow up on complaints and investigations, the implementation of a national plan for human rights, the adoption of measures and legal modifications to protect social protests and mobilizations, and the creation of an advisory commission on human rights for the government and public institutions.(121)

End of the conflict (June 23, 2016 and August 24, 2016)(Redaguoti)

The government and the FARC reached an agreement on three of the main points – bilateral and definite ceasefire, decommissioning of weapons and security guarantees – of the third item on the agenda, 'end of the conflict', on June 23, 2016.

Bilateral and definite ceasefire(Redaguoti)

The bilateral and definite ceasefire is the definite end of hostilities and offensive actions between the government and the FARC.(127) Following the announcement of the final agreement on August 24, President Juan Manuel Santos declared that the bilateral and definite ceasefire would begin at midnight on Monday, August 29, 2016.(128)

Monitoring and Verification Mechanism(Redaguoti)

A tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MM&V) would monitor and verify implementation of the agreement and compliance with the rules governing the ceasefire and decommissioning of weapons. The MM&V would be integrated by representatives of the Colombian government, the FARC and an International Component made up of unarmed United Nations (UN) observers from Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) member states. The mechanism would have three instances or levels: one national, eight regional verifying structures and 'some' local monitoring structures. The International Component would preside over all levels of the mechanism, resolve disagreements (such as incidents and violations of the ceasefire or disarmament), present recommendations and present written reports.(127)

Transitory rural settlement normalization zones and encampments(Redaguoti)

23 Transitory rural settlement normalization zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización, ZVTN) and 8 encampents/transitory normalization points (Puntos Transitorios de Normalización, PTN) would be established throughout the country to manage the disarmament of the FARC and assist in their reincorporation in civilian life.

The day following the formal signature of the final agreement, the armed forces would make the necessary logistical adjustments to facilitate the FARC's units displacement to these zones. The FARC would begin moving to these zones following mutually agreed routes of deployment. The MM&V would monitor and verify the safe movement of the FARC's units to the zones.(127)

The ZVTN would be located in mutually agreed veredas, or rural settlements, within municipalities and be accessible by land or water. They would be of 'reasonable size' to allow monitoring and verification by the MM&V and compliance with the stated objectives of the ZVTN. Once all of its men have moved to their ZVTN, the FARC would provide the government with a list of its members present in each ZVTN and the government would suspend arrest warrants for all FARC members located in the zones. While in these zones, the FARC, in coordination with the government, would be allowed to perform any type of training or education for its members. FARC combatants and militiamen would be allowed to leave the zones only in civilian clothing and without weapons.

The normal functioning of unarmed elected civilian authorities within these zones would not be impeded in any way, and representatives of these civilian local authorities would have the right to permanently enter these zones except for encampments where the FARC would be concentrated. There would be civilian population within the FARC's encampments in the zones, and civilians' legal right to bear arms would be suspended for the entire duration of the zones.(127)

For the duration of the agreement on the ceasefire and disarmament, the FARC would designate a group of 60 disarmed members to travel throughout the national territory in performance of tasks related to the peace agreement; likewise, within each zone, a group of 10 members of the guerrilla would travel within the municipality and department for the same reasons.

The MM&V would be charged with monitoring and verifying compliance with the mutually agreed rules governing the ZVTN. In the case that events or circumstances within the zone require the presence of the National Police or any other public authority, its entry would be coordinated by the MM&V.

A one kilometer wide demilitarized security zone would be created around each ZVTN, in which no military or FARC unit would be permitted entry with the exception of MM&V teams accompanied by the police if necessary.

The government and the FARC have jointly defined security protocols to guarantee the security and protection of persons (MM&V observers, public servants, FARC and civilian population), the deployment routes, deployments in the zones and the manipulation, storage, transportation and control of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

The 23 ZVTN and 8 PTN would be located in 30 municipalities in 15 departments, as follows: Fonseca (Guajira), La Paz (Cesar), Tibú (Norte de Santander), Remedios (Antioquia), Ituango (Antioquia), Dabeiba (Antioquia), Vigía del Fuerte (Antioquia), Riosucio (Chocó), Tierralta (Córdoba), Planadas (Tolima), Villarrica (Tolima), Buenos Aires (Cauca), Caldono (Cauca), Corinto (Cauca), Policarpa (Nariño), Tumaco (Nariño), Puerto Asís (Putumayo), Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá), La Montañita (Caquetá), San Vicente del Caguán (Caqueta), Arauquita (Arauca), Tame (Arauca), Mesetas (Meta), Vista Hermosa (Meta), La Macarena (Meta), Mapiripán (Meta), Cumaribo (Vichada), San José del Guaviare (Guaviare), Calamar and El Retorno (Guaviare).(111)

Decommissioning(Redaguoti)

The decommissioning of weapons is a "technical, traceable and verifiable procedure through which the UN receives all the weapons of the FARC to destine them to the construction of 3 monuments"(127) The FARC's decommissioning would involve the following technical procedures: registration, identification, monitoring and verification of possession, collection, storage, disablement, removal and final disposition. In short, after the UN registers, identifies and verifies possession of weapons, it would collect all of the FARC's weapons, store them in specific containers, remove them from the zone and disposes of them by building three monuments.

Five days after the formal signature of the final agreement, the FARC would provide the UN with the necessary information for the decommissioning. The FARC would contribute by different means, including the provision of information and the cleaning and decontamination of areas affected by landmines, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnances and explosive remnants of war.

The decommissioning would take place gradually over 6 months (180 days) from the formal signature of the final agreement ('D-day'). From the fifth to thirtieth day following D-day, the FARC would move to the ZVTN transporting all their individual and secondary weapons, militia armament, grenades and ammunition. The formal decommissioning of weapons would begin once all members of the FARC have reached the zones. The collection and storage of weapons would take place in three phases: 30% of weapons by D+90, an additional 30% of weapons by D+120 and the remaining 40% by D+150. By D+180 at the latest, or six months from the signature of the final agreement, the UN would have completed the process of extraction of weapons and would certify compliance of this process and duly inform public opinion. The bilateral ceasefire and the functioning the zones would end on D+180.

All stages of the decommissioning process would be verified by the MM&V.(127)

Reincorporation of the FARC(Redaguoti)

In addition to the measures to be adopted for the political reincorporation of the FARC (their transformation into a political party), the final agreement provides additional measures for the socioeconomic reincorporation.

To promote a collective socioeconomic reincorporation, the FARC would create an organization called Economías Sociales del Común (ECOMÚN), in which membership would be voluntary. The government would assist ECOMÚN by funding its legal and technical advice and expediting its creation. In addition, the group of citizens who would promote the creation of the FARC's future political party or movement would create a non-profit centre of political thought and education which would advance social studies and research and create political education programs. The government would also assist its creation by setting aside an annual sum of public money until 2022.

A National Reincorporation Council (Consejo Nacional de la Reincorporación, CNR) would be created, made up of 2 members of the government and 2 members of the FARC, and with the objective of defining the activities, timeline and follow-up of the reincorporation process.

For the purposes of managing the reincorporation process, the FARC would, following its settlement in the aforementioned zones, provide the government with a complete list of all its members which would be revised and certified by the government in good faith. Once the FARC have surrendered their weapon and expressed their commitment to comply with the agreement to reincorporate to civilian life, they would be accredited by the government.

The government would identify the necessities of the socioeconomic reincorporation process through a socioeconomic census, identify possible productive programs and projects for demobilized members of the FARC and would create a one-time fund for the execution of such programs through ECOMÚN. In addition, for such purposes, each member of the FARC would have the right to a one-time economic support payment of 8 million pesos to undertake an individual or collective project.

All members of the FARC, for 24 months following the end of the decommissioning process in the zones, would receive a monthly payment equivalent to 90% of the legal monthly minimum wage, as long as they lack another source of revenue. Afterwards, a monthly payment to be defined by law would be given to reincorporated members who have chosen to continue their studies. In addition to the above, at the end of the functioning of the zones, all members of the FARC would receive a one-time payment of 2 million pesos. The government would pay the social security contributions for those members lacking a source of revenue.

Various social programs – including formal education, vocational training, recognition of knowledge, housing, culture, sports, recreation, environmental protection, psycho-social attention, family reunification – would be identified and developed as necessary to help the reincorporation of the FARC.(111)

Security guarantees(Redaguoti)

On June 23, the government and the FARC also announced a set of security guarantees to protect the security of all inhabitants, and specific measures for the protection of communities, social movements, political movements and the FARC's future political movement. In addition, the agreement includes the implementation of measures to intensify the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the fight against criminal organizations which threaten the peace. Some of the main objectives of these security guarantees are respect, protection and promotion of human rights; ensure the State's legitimate monopoly one the use of force throughout the territory and strengthening the administration of justice.(129)

The main security guarantees and measures are:(129)

  • Un national political pact from the regions and with all political parties and movements, unions, civil society and all other major participants in the civic life of Colombia rejecting the use of arms in politics or the promotion of violent organizations like paramilitarism.
  • Un National Commission of Security Guarantees presided by the President would have the goal of designing and monitoring public and criminal policy on the dismantlement of all criminal organizations and persecution of other criminal conducts threatening the peace agreement.
  • Un Special Investigation Unit within the Attorney General's office for the dismantlement of all criminal organizations and paramilitary successor organizations. It would investigation, prosecution and indictment of criminal organizations responsible for homicides, massacres, gender violence or attacks on social and political movements.
  • Furthering the item on political participation, a Comprehensive Security System for political participation led by a high-level body and a technical committee, would implement a protection program to protect members of the new party or movement founded by the FARC but also other parties, social movement, community organizations and human rights advocates. For such purposes, a dedicated sub-unit of the National Protection Unit (which would include demobilized members of the FARC) and a security and protection body (with members of the FARC's political movement in liaison with the National Police), would be created.
  • Un Comprehensive Security and Protection Program for communities and organizations in the territories would adopt and define protection measures for organizations, groups and communities in the regions.
  • An elite corps of the National Police to dismantle criminal organizations.
  • Prevention and monitoring instrument of criminal organizations, a system of anticipation and prevention for rapid reaction.
  • Anti-corruption measures, including policies to curb the penetration of the criminal organizations and behaviours.
  • Security guarantees for judges, prosecutors and other public servants.
  • A national mechanism to supervise and inspect regional private security companies and services.

Implementation and verification(Redaguoti)

For the purposes of the implementation and verification of the final agreement (item 6 of the agenda), an Implementation, Monitoring, Verification and Dispute Resolution Commission of the Final Peace Agreement (Comisión de Implementación, Seguimiento y Verificación del Acuerdo Final de Paz y de Resolución de Diferencias, CSVR) would be created following the formal signature of the final agreement. It would be made up of three representatives of the government and three representatives of the FARC or its successor political party and would last until January 2019, at which time its members would decide on its continuation until 2026. During the 180-day ceasefire and decommissioning process, the CSVR would be accompanied by one delegate from each of the two guarantor countries (Cuba and Norway) and one delegate from each of the two accompanying countries (Venezuela and Chile).(111)

The commission's objectives would be the resolution of differences, monitoring of the implementation of the final agreement, verification of compliance, monitoring of the legislative implementation of the agreement and reporting on the implementation. Mechanisms would allow for citizen participation in the process.

The CSVR's various responsibilities would include:(111)

  • Adoption, within four months of its creation, of a framework plan for the implementation of the agreements. The plan would include all the objectives, goals, priorities, indicators, policy recommendations and timeline for the implementation of the agreement. The plan would be valid for ten years, with a first implementation phase lasting until 2019, and it would be revised annually.
  • Resolution of all disputes or unforeseen situations, in the absence of other dispute resolution mechanisms elsewhere in the agreement.
  • Use as a space to manage any situations or differences arising after the signature of the final agreement, which does not involve the UN.
  • Monitor all components of the final agreement and verify its implementation, notwithstanding the role of the MM&V.
  • Propose drafts of bills or resolutions necessary for the implementation of the agreement.
  • Organize thematic and territorial commissions.
  • Produce periodic reports on the implementation of the agreement
  • Receive information and reports from other bodies charged with the implementation of the agreement such as civic organizations, universities, research centres etc.

Additional measures to implement the agreements include:(111)

  • Legal revisions to ensure that departmental and municipal development plans include measures to guarantee implementation of the agreement.
  • Use of central government funds and royalties to finance the implementation of the agreement.
  • Promotion of the private sector's participation in the implementation of the agreement to ensure growth, stability and the viability of the programs in the agreement.
  • Stimulating the reception of international cooperation and aid funds.
  • Promotion of social organization's participation in the execution of the programs in the agreement.
  • Creation of an integrated information system, to guarantee transparency in the implementation of the agreement. This system would include interactive online maps, regular accountability mechanisms, citizen oversight, transparency observatories, IT tools for the general public, mechanisms for citizens' complaints and internal control mechanisms.

As agreed on May 11, 2016, the final agreement would be considered as a special agreement under the terms of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and registered, following its signature, before the Swiss Federal Council in Bern. Afterwards, the President would make a unilateral declaration in the name of the Colombian State before the Secretary General of the UN, relating the final agreement to Resolution 2261 of January 25, 2016.

The immediate priorities for the implementation of the agreement are:(111)

  • An amnesty law and constitutional amendment for the JEP.
  • Law approving the final agreement.
  • Constitutional amendment incorporating the text of the final agreement to the Constitution.
  • Constitutional and legal norms for the search unit for missing persons.
  • Law for the special unit for the dismantlement of all criminal organizations.
  • Law for special legal treatment for offences related to cultivation of illicit crops when the cultivators are not members of an armed group.
  • Suspension of arrest warrants and extradition procedures against members of the FARC and accused collaborators.
  • Constitutional and legislative amendments for guarantees and political participation of the FARC's new party.

Legislative Act 1 of 2016 amends the Constitution to create a special legislative procedure for the implementation of the agreement, for a six-month period renewable once. According to the special process:(130)

  • Bills and proposed constitutional amendments for the implementation of the agreement may only be initiated by the government.
  • Bills and proposed constitutional amendments under the special legislative procedure would have priority over all other bills.
  • The first debate on these bills would be held in a joint session of the permanent constitutional commissions of both houses. The second debate would be plenary debates on the floor of both houses.
  • Bills would be approved with the majorities required by law or the Constitution.
  • The legislative process would consist of only four debates, within eight days in both houses.
  • Bills may only be modified with the government's approval to conform to the final agreement.
  • Votes in commissions and plenaries would be on the entirety of the bills.
  • Bills and proposed constitutional amendments would be subject to automatic judicial review, following their promulgation. Judicial review of constitutional amendments may only be for procedural defects.

In addition, the amendment gives the President special powers to issue legally binding decrees for the implementation of the agreement during a six-month period. These decrees are also subject to automatic judicial review.

However, Legislative Act 1 of 2016 would only become valid following popular ratification of the final agreement in the plebiscite on October 2, 2016.

The CSVR would include a verification mechanism, with an international component. The verification mechanism would include two respected figures of international renown to be selected by the government and the FARC, and the international component would include a representative from each one of the guarantor and accompanying countries. It would also include a technical component, with the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University designing the methodology to identify advances in the implementation. The verification mechanism would objectively verify the state of the implementation of the agreement, identify delays or deficiencies, provide continuous support and contribute to strengthening the agreement's implementation.(111)

The government and the FARC would request from the United Nations the creation of a new political mission, following the end of the UN's mission as part of the MM&V. The second political mission would verify the FARC's reincorporation to civic life and the implementation of the security and protection measures. The UN's mission could last up to three years.(111)

The international support for the implementation of the agreement would be meant to strengthen guarantees for the implementation of the agreement and would bring experiences, resources, monitoring and best practices to contribute to the implementation of the agreement. Some of the international organizations sought include the European Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization, Via Campesina, Unasur, Switzerland, the Dutch Institute for Multi-party democracy, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United States of America, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Red Cross, the International Center for Transitional Justice, Sweden and UN Women.(111)

At least 500 social leaders have been killed between the signing of the agreement and April 2019.(131) The former leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño, claimed in an open letter to Colombian President Iván Duque in June 2019 that about 160 ex-fighters and their family members have been killed since the peace deal was signed.(132)

See also(Redaguoti)

Nuorodos(Redaguoti)

  1. ^ a b "Colombia signs new peace deal with Farc". BBC News. 24 November 2016.
  2. ^ a b c "Colombia's congress approves historic peace deal with FARC rebels". Washington Post. 30 November 2016.
  3. ^ Bouvier, Virginia M. (2009). Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press. p. 141.
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External links(Redaguoti)


Le processus de paix colombien – Wikipedia ® garantie santé entreprise
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